Method for Detecting Software Faults During Udut Covariance Calculations Used in Kalman Filtering by Moan, Michael R.
OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY 
A METHOD FOR DETECTING SOFIWARE FAULTS 
DURING UDUT COVARIANCE CALCULATIONS 
USED IN KALMAN FILTERING 
Thesis Approved: 
, -~Dean of the Graduate College 
ii 
A METHOD FOR DETECTING SOFIW ARE FAULTS 
DURING UDUT COVARIANCE CALCULATIONS 
USED IN KALMAN FILTERING 
By 
MICHAEL R. MOAN 
Bachelor of Science 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 
1986 
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College 
of the Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
July, 1993 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my major adviser, Dr. Gary 
Young, for his guidance, support, and encouragement throughout the course of this 
study. I also extend my appreciation to the other committee members, Dr. L. L. 
Hoberock and Dr. E. A. Misawa. 
Special appreciation is offered to the School of Mechanical Engineering at 
Oklahoma State University for their assistance throughout my academic career. 
Finally, many thanks and much love go to my family for their enduring support. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
l INTRODUCTION ... ... ....... ... ... ....... ... ... .... ................ ... ... .... ... ... ....... .......... 1 
Il BACKGROUND .. . .. .. ... ... ... .......... ... ... ..... ... ... ............. ... ... ... ................... ... 6 
Software Fault Tolerance ............................................................ 7 
Failure Modes and the Acceptance Test .................................... 10 
Numerical Stability ..................................................................... 11 
Need for Suboptimal Secondary Processes ........... ........... .......... 15 
Hardware Failure Detection and Isolation ................................. 17 
General Considerations ............................................................... 18 
Detecting Computational Faults ................................................. 19 
Ill METHODOLOGY ........... .. .............. .... ......... ............ .. ...... .......... ...... ..... ... 20 
Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance ............................................... 20 
Using ABFT Techniques With the Kalman Filter ........................ 22 
Additions to the Bierman UDUT Algorithms .................... ........ 24 
UDUT Time Update of the Error Covariance ............................ 25 
Software Fault Detection Additions to the 
Time Update Algorithm ...... .... .. .... .. .. ...... ............................... 28 
UDUT Measurement Update of the 
Error Covariance ..... ........... .... . ........ ........ ........ ............... ......... 30 
Software Fault Detection Additions to the 
Measurement Update Algorithm ............................................ 34 
N. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION................................................................. 38 
Simulation Environment .............................................................. 38 
Results......................................................................................... 39 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................ 68 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... 70 
APPENDIX -SIMULATION SOFTWARE .............................................................. 73 
iv 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Operations Counts for the Standard Time Update 
Algorithm and ABFT Additions .................................................................... 31 
2. Computational Costs for the ABFT Additions in Terms 
of a Percentage of Original Operations for the Time 
Update Algorithm ..... .... .. ........ ........ .... ............... ........ .......... .... .... .. .. ...... .... .... 31 
3. Operations Counts for the Standard Measurement 
Update Algorithm and ABFT Additions ....................................................... 37 
4. Computational Costs for the ABFT Additions in 
Terms of a Percentage of Original Operations 
for the Measurement Update Algorithm........................................................ 37 
v 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1. Computing Node Environments oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 3 
20 Fault Tolerant State Estimation Scheme Combined With a 
Distributed Recovery Block Structure 00 000 000000000 oooooo 00000000000000000000000 0000000 oooooooooooooo-ooo 8 
30 Schematic of Task Partitioning for Estimation and Control oooooooooooooooo······o·········o 9 
40 Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 1, Steps 0 to 100 .... o ............ o .................... o ...... o .......... o ................ o......................... 40 
5. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 1, Steps 101 to 200 ...................... o ..................... o ........ o ......................... o .. o .... o...... 41 
6. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 1, Steps 0 to 100................................................................................................... 42 
70 Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 1, Steps 101 to 200 ....................................................................... o ...................... o 43 
8o Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 2, Steps 0 to 100 ........................................................................................ 0.......... 44 
90 Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 2, Steps 101 to 200 ...................................................................... 0 ..0..................... 45 
10. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 2, Steps 0 to 100 ...................... o ............... oo ........................... oo ...... oo .............. o .. ooooo 46 
110 Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 2, Steps 101 to 200o ............ o ...................................................... o.......................... 47 
12 Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 3, Steps 0 to 100 ...... o.... .... .. ........................................ ............ ................. ............. 48 
130 Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 3, Steps 0 to 100 ............................................................ o ...... o ........ o ...... o .............. o 49 
140 Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 4, Steps 0 to 100 ...... o ...... o ........ o .............. o .................. o ................ o ........... o ...... o...... 50 
vi 
Figure Page 
15. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 4, Steps 101 to 200................................................................................................. 51 
16. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 4, Steps 0 to 100..................................................................................................... 52 
17. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 4, Steps 101 to 200...... ........ ...... ...... ......... .................. ... .. .... .... .... ... ........... .......... ... 53 
18. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 5, Steps 0 to 100.... ............ ......... ................ ... .... ...... .. .. .. .......... .... ... .. ............ .......... 54 
19. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 5, Steps 101 to 200................................................................................................. 55 
20. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 5, Steps 0 to 100 ....... ...... ....... ... .. .. ... .. . .... .... ............ ... .... .......... ....... .... ............ ........ 56 
21. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 5, Steps 101 to 200.... ... .. .. ........... .... ......... ..... .... ....... ..... .. ....... ............... .............. ... 57 
22. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 6, Steps 0 to 100..................................................................................................... 58 
23. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 6, Steps 101 to 200 .............. .... .. ........... ....... .... ............. ............. ... .. .... ..... .... .......... 59 
24. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 6, Steps 0 to 100..................................................................................................... 60 
25. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 6, Steps 101 to 200................................................................................................. 61 
26. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 7, Steps 0 to 100..................................................................................................... 62 
27. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Kalman Gains, 
Case 7, Steps 101 to 200................................................................................................. 63 
28 Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 7, Steps 0 to 100..................................................................................................... 64 
29. Software Fault Effect on Single Measurement UDUT Error Covariance, 
Case 7, Steps 101 to 200.. ..... .. ..... ............ .............. .... ............ ..... .... ... .. ............ ............... 65 
vii 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In many mechanical control applications, the proliferation of low cost general 
purpose microcomputers has allowed networking across large spatial distances and 
the development of complex distributed control systems. Many of these control 
systems implement algorithms with hard real-time constraints. For stability of the 
controlled process, it may be required that not a single control output be missed, 
corrupted, or delayed. Methods for implementing algorithms in fault tolerant, 
reliable, and numerically stable fashion are critical to meeting these demanding 
constraints. Because of the importance of prior research in these areas, this thesis 
reviews some of the existing methods for achieving fault tolerant and reliable 
algorithms. In addition to the review, the contribution of this thesis involves the use 
of a concept for encoding control algorithms so that software failures may be 
detected promptly before control actions are performed or sensor I actuator failure 
decisions are made. In this thesis, a software failure is defined to be a non-
catastrophic circumstance in which the software continues to run but cannot correctly 
compute the intended results. A variety of computing environment faults or failures 
could cause a software failure of this definition, and they range from single chip 
MTBF failures to communication problems in multi-processing environments. In 
regard to the contribution, the proposed concept is applied to the Bierman algorithm 
for uouT time and measurement update of the error covariance of the Kalman filter 
[1, 2]. This algorithm was chosen as a representative algorithm because of its 
popularity in industrial applications for the sequential processing of measurement 
information. The methods to be discussed are intended for the application level of a 
1 
2 
software hierarchy. Many of the reviewed techniques were developed for stand-
alone uniprocessors, but can or have been extended to supervisory and distributed 
systems for node self-diagnostics and acceptance tests whose existence is to prevent 
corrupt information from being passed to higher levels of authority and control. 
The following typical systems, shown in Figures 1a and 1 b, describe the 
computing node environments which are addressed. For high throughput, high 
bandwidth applications such as found in modern digital signal processing and 
control, multiprocessor architectures with systolic arrays, transputers or digital signal 
processors (DSPs) have been used to implement high order filters and other 
computationally intensive algorithms (Bromley, Kung, Swartzlander et al.,1988) [3]. 
Such parallelism and concurrency have been needed because uniprocessor 
implementations have historically been restricted by sampling rates which are 
dictated by the time taken for one step of recursive filters such as the Kalman Filter. 
For these implementations, uniprocessors with Real Time Operating Systems (RTOS) 
are commonly relegated to supervisory tasks such as control of data flow into and 
out of the array processor, network interface, graphical user interface, statistical 
analysis, set pointing, data storage, and control of peripherals, while number 
crunching is left to the array processors (Jacklin, 1988) [4]. For this case, the self-
tests and audits which add fault tolerance, failure detection and stability may be an 
additional responsibility of the supervisory processor. However, if the processing 
can be distributed among several uniprocessors without the need for an array 
processor, tasks associated with recursive computations as well as self-test and 
diagnostic tasks may be implemented on each node of a distributed system of 
uniprocessors as depicted in Figure 1b, some taking advantage of the services and 
facilities of a multi-tasking RTOS. As an alternative to multiprocessing with a 
distributed system of uniprocessors, DSP solutions which are currently available use 
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both multiprocessing and real time operating systems for applications with high 
computational loads. They are available in both single and multiple board con-
figurations. 
CHAPTER IT 
BACKGROUND 
While much research exists for general purpose modeling and the specification of 
real time systems and software, published research concerning the stability and fault 
tolerance of RTOS software implementations of control algorithms is limited. 
According to Kim [SJ, major issues associated with designing fault tolerant capabilities 
into hard-real-time distributed computing systems need to be resolved in the 1990s. 
To help resolve the issues, research is in progress on such techniques as N-version 
programming, Built-In-Test software, Data Redundancy, Checksums, Distributed 
Recovery Blocks, Comparing Schemes, and Triple Modular Redundancy. Also, 
modeling methods such as Petri Nets, Data Flow Diagrams, Finite State Automata, 
and State Charts provide tools for analysis. However, fault tolerant software 
strategies which exist in literature seem to be for generic applications or processes and 
not specifically related to particular control algorithms. To help fill this gap, 
subsequent sections review techniques which are common in the control community 
and should be considered for use as the self tests, data validations, acceptance tests, 
and other components of the overall fault tolerant software solution. As an aside, in 
the event of a permanent, non-correctable fault or failure, it is often a requirement of 
the system to reconfigure to work in the presence of the fault. The redefinition of 
processing responsibilities among the remaining processing nodes, or in the case of a 
uniprocessor, the remaining operable tasks, must be coordinated. Literature available 
on the stability of this reconfiguration process includes that of Mariton [6] and 
Srichander and Walker [7]. 
6 
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Software Fault Tolerance 
To begin, we need to review a few of the general definitions and concepts of 
software fault tolerance. Similar to how redundancy, built-in self-tests, and 
diagnostics are used to add reliability to computing hardware, software is even more 
flexible in regard to the addition of redundancy and self-tests given sufficient 
computing resources and timing constraints. Checkpointing and roll back recovery are 
very common techniques. According to Kim [5] (1988), checkpointing refers to saving 
the state of computation on a secure device at various execution points called recovery 
points (RP). When a fault happens, the system is able to resume computation or "roll 
back" to the most recent RP after any necessary reconfiguration. To determine if a 
fault occurs, some form of acceptance test must be performed to indicate the fault. As 
our concern is with the substance of the acceptance test in the context of common 
control algorithms, Figures 2 and 3 are two fault tolerant schemes (Kim, 1988) which 
use checkpointing and acceptance tests and have been adapted to illustrate a state 
estimation process using the Kalman filter. 
Figure 2 illustrates the use of primary and backup versions of Kalman filters in a 
Distributed Recovery Block scheme (Kim, 1988). This scheme uses multiple processors 
or nodes to achieve active redundancy by concurrently executing multiple versions of a 
software component. The same acceptance test is used for results from different 
versions of software. The scheme includes a time out mechanism such as a watch dog 
timer. Each recovery block consists of one or more routines, called "try blocks" by Kim, 
which compute functionally equivalent results. In the figure, the try blocks consist of 
Kalman filters and suboptimal filters. The acceptance test contains the criteria used 
for accepting the results. By Kim's definition, a recovery block could contain two or 
more try blocks. If desired, the scheme could be set up as a tandem system duplicating 
its running process with corresponding identical processes running on the other 
processors. Figure 3 shows an adaptation of a conversation scheme (Kim, 1988). 
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Figure 2. Fault Tolerant State Estimation Scheme Combined With a 
Distributed Recovery Block Structure 
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This scheme illustrates how controller functions might be partitioned into a set of tasks 
which run concurrently, communicate between each other periodically, and deliver a 
result by the end of the time step regardless of missing communication or data. The 
tasks include state estimation functions and the control law functions. In both 
schemes, the most recent accepted state and covariance would be saved in a buffer at 
the recovery points, and upon failed acceptance of the primary results, the system 
would either restart from the previous recovery point, which may not be desirable 
when a state estimate is needed by the end of a time step, or would accept the state 
estimate from backup or secondary processes which might be suboptimal. Possible 
secondary processes might feature reduced real time computational load, assumptions 
of almost or completely time invariant and linear system response over short periods 
of operation, and the use of precomputed gains and state error covariance. Such 
secondary processes would be particularly applicable during instances when process 
noise dominates the system (Gylys, 1983) [8]. Secondary processes might also use 
lookup tables to determine noise levels under differing operating conditions. 
Failure Modes and the Acceptance Test 
Before considering what should be included in an acceptance test, it is 
appropriate to analyze how the implementation might be expected to fail. Since the 
acceptance test also represents software which could fail, the sophistication of the 
recovery points and acceptance tests should be balanced against the additional 
computational cost and complexity. Depending on the need for safety and reliability, 
software associated with fault tolerance should be parsimoniously applied. In regard 
to general failure modes, causes of software failure are language and design 
methodology dependent. Even with good software engineering practices, they are so 
varied that it is impossible to adequately test for every possibility before the software 
is in operational use. Once in operational use, processor failures resulting from chip 
MTBFs and communication failures during high speed data transfers can occur in a 
11 
MTBFs and communication failures during high speed data transfers can occur in a 
subtle manner and result in incorrect results. We would like to have an acceptance test 
which covers a large number of the potential faults. To this end, the following topics 
exist in literature and concern typical modes of failure for recursive control algorithms. 
Numerical Stability 
The acceptance tests might be expected to check for numerical stability at the end 
of each step of the recursion. Use of the Kalman filter to discuss numerical stability 
issues is appropriate because the Kalman filter is a part of the group of kernel 
algorithms used in a variety of applications including recursive parameter estimation 
and adaptive control (Astrom, p. 412, 1989) [9], (Clarke, p. 62, 1984) [10]. The 
following equations present typical nomenclature for a time variant, discrete, linear 
state space representation of the system model and measurement process, and the 
elements of a conventional Kalman filter. 
Dynamic Model 
with: 
Xk = x(tk) e Rn, <I>k = <I>(tk, tk+ 1 ), 
rok = ro(tk) e RP, Bk = B(tk, tk+ 1 ), 
uk = u(tk) e RL, rk = r<tk, tk+ 1>, 
E[rok(i)) = 0, E[rokrok T] = Qk()jj 
(1) 
(2)-(8) 
where Xk is the state vector to be estimated, ~k is the estimated state, Uk is the 
deterministic input vector, <I>k and rk and Bk are time variant, discrete time system 
matrices. The process noise vector rok is usually assumed to be a zero mean, gaussian 
sequence with constant variance, independent of and uncorrelated with the 
12 
measurement noise sequence. Qk is a positive semidefinite process noise covariance 
matrix. 
Measurement Model 
with: 
zk = z(tk) e RID, Hk = H(tk) 
vk = v(tk) e RID 
E[vk(i)) = 0, E[vkvk T] = Rk8jj 
(9) 
(10)-(14) 
where zk is the measurement vector to be processed, and Hk is the observation matrix. 
The measurement noise vector vk is usually assumed to be a zero mean, gaussian 
sequence with constant variance, independent of and uncorrelated with the process 
noise. Rk is a positive definite measurement noise covariance matrix. 
Computation of Kalman Gain 
(15) 
or 
(16) 
Conventional Measurement Update of Error Covariance 
Joseph's Form of Measurement Update of Error Covariance 
(18) 
13 
State Estimate Based on Current Measurement 
(19) 
Time Propagation of State 
(20) 
Time Propagation of Error Covariance 
(21) 
Estimates of the initial state and error covariance, x(O) and P(O), are usually assumed 
to be known a priori. 
The conventional form of the covariance measurement update for the Kalman 
filter can be numerically unstable when using single precision arithmetic or when the 
modeled process is unstable. Roundoff errors and over convergence can cause the 
state error covariance matrix to divergently loose symmetry and positive definiteness. 
Although inaccurate modeling of the system or discretization errors can also cause 
filter divergence (Gelb, 1974) [11], assume that accurate model structure and 
parameters are available at each step of the recursion in at least one of the try blocks, 
and momentarily that numerical issues are the primarily topic of concern for the 
acceptance test. Methods available for use in the acceptance tests and for correction 
of the conventional filter include averaging the error covariance matrix with its 
transpose, computing only the upper or lower part of the matrix, or adding to the 
diagonal elements upon detection of negative eigenvalues. Verhaegen and Van Dooren 
(1988) presented an analysis of error propagation due to roundoff which explains why 
these heuristic methods work for the conventional covariance update [12]. Having 
recognized that the conventional filter mechanization may be numerically unstable, the 
complexity of an acceptance test will depend upon whether the application uses a 
14 
modified version of the conventional algorithm or an alternative, numerically stable 
mechanization. 
The version of the error covariance measurement update, commonly called 
"Joseph's" form, does not require symmetry detection/correction of the error covariance 
matrix. Thus, when using "Joseph's" form, the acceptance test would not be required to 
perform such a test. Also, other numerically stable mechanizations retain symmetry by 
propagating a factored version of the error covariance matrix. They are often referred 
to as "square root" algorithms even though the methods may be based on Choleski, 
uouT or other factor types, and they may be based on sequential or simultaneous 
processing of the measurement vector. These filter mechanizations are equivalent to 
the original form in that they result in optimal rather than suboptimal estimates, and 
they can be more computationally expensive (Thorton and Bierman, 1981} [2] (Chin, 
1983) [13] but generally give more accurate filter estimates and gains (Verhaegen and 
Van Dooren, 1988) [12]. Like "Joseph's" form, an acceptance test for a numerically 
stable filtering process would only involve ensuring that computations are performed 
correctly and would not involve checks for a positive definite error covariance matrix. 
Therefore, when the additional computational expense of an acceptance test is 
considered, the square root algorithm's become even more desirable, particularly when 
calculations are being performed with time varying system matrices and unstable 
process scenarios are known to exist. 
Instead of waiting until the end of the time step, the acceptance test may be 
performed at subintervals of the main time frame. Breaking the acceptance test up into 
several smaller tests may be an option if sequential processing of measurement 
information if performed rather than simultaneous processing. When the noise 
covariance matrix is diagonal, the covariance measurement update can be done by 
sequentially processing one measurement at a time, thus allowing the computation to 
be tested at intermediate points after the update from each measurement. Because of 
the convenience of inverting scalars opposed to matrices, some of the most popular 
15 
numerically stable versions for updating error covariance are based on sequential 
processing. Not much is lost, however, because sequential processing of the Kalman 
filter has long been advocated in cases of uncorrelated measurement noise as a method 
of avoiding the program storage and computation requirements for inverting the 
innovations covariance matrix [HPHT + R] (Sorenson, p. 256, 1966) (Gelb, p. 304, 
1974) [14, 11]. Thus, sequential processing facilitates the detection of computation 
failures at an earlier time within the overall time step frame, and possible use of 
remaining time to perform correction or processing with secondary processes. With 
sequential processing, the filtering task can also be efficiently interrupted by other 
tasks between measurement iterations, with a reduced chance of corrupting 
information during context switches. The measurement updates do not have to be 
performed in any particular order, and individual measurements can be incorporated 
as they become available, without having to wait until all measurements are received 
and validated. Because sequential processing avoids the computational and storage 
requirements for an algorithm which explicitly determines the inverse of a matrix, no 
acceptance tests are necessary to ensure that the inversion was performed correctly. 
Furthermore, for less sophisticated RTOS environments, shorter and more independent 
calculations might prevent loss of information caused by non-maskable interrupts 
during longer time blocks of CPU usage required by simultaneous processing. Note 
that in one time step of sequential processing, the covariance matrix is not complete 
until the last measurement has been incorporated. 
Need for Suboptimal Secondary Processes 
Estimation and control systems frequently encounter missing, time delayed, 
and/ or invalid sensor observations. The following situations can all cause invalid 
measurements: (1) sensor failures, (2) time skewing and improper ordering of data, (3) 
network induced delays, (4) intermittent loss of signals during transient periods of high 
noise, (5) sensor saturation, and (6) nonlinear sensor behavior. When measurement 
16 
data is missing or unreliable, recursive estimation algorithms such as the Kalman filter 
do not give optimal estimates and would be expected to fail a fault tolerance 
acceptance test. In such cases, the alternative or secondary process must provide the 
suboptimal information necessary to continue the computation. This section discusses 
typical methods used to test and compensate for corrupt, missing, or time-delayed 
measurements. 
As expected, heuristic methods for use in an acceptance test for measurement 
validation and inference for the Kalman filter exist throughout the literature. According 
to V. Gylys (1983) [8], when considering the robustness of an estimation process, 
distributional assumptions can be bad and/ or measurements can be bad. Because bad 
measurements can exist, Gylys suggests that the pre-processing and screening of 
measurements to be used in the Kalman filter should "(1) screen against outliers, (2) 
detect leading and trailing edges of high amplitude noise bursts, (3) detect the onset 
and compensate for nonwhiteness in measurement noise, and (4) censor or bound 
measurements or estimates," and that "preprocessing may include conversion and 
prefiltering, computation of measurement residuals, and screening of residuals for 
rejection." For instance, electro-magnetic compatibility problems can cause severe 
measurement noise. Gylys also mentions that a± scaled multiple of the innovations 
variance can be used as an acceptance interval to screen measurement residuals. 
Statistical inference based on the innovation or residual sequence (z(k)-H(k)~(k I k-1)) 
is another method for validating measurements and monitoring software imple-
mentation. However, T. H. Kerr (1990, p. 944) [15], on validating linear systems 
software, points out that small residuals are necessary but not sufficient indicators of 
good filter performance and that similar statements can be made concerning statis-
tically white residuals. 
For use as a secondary process, an intuitively appealing method of Kalman 
filtering when a single measurement vector is missing is to simply skip the measurement 
17 
update and rely on the time propagated state estimate. Guanrong Chen (1990) [16] 
showed that the predicted estimate of the state, ~k 1 k-1 = <1>k-1~k-11 k-1 + rk-1Uk-1, 
could replace the unknown optimal estimate, ~k 1 k, and that convergence could be 
guaranteed for time invariant cases, for a single bit of missing data, when no other 
data is missed in the future. Motivation for using the estimate as a secondary process 
is that at the instant when the data is missing, a suboptimal estimate of the unknown 
state vector Xk is still needed in real time for control law or other purposes with hard 
time constraints. Usually, the possibility of system instability prevents waiting for late 
arrival of the missing data and the system must proceed to the successor time step, but 
Luck and Ray (1990) [17] and Zhang and Ray (1991) [18] have proposed a multi-step 
predictor for compensation of the effects of network induced delays. 
Another alternative secondary process when data is missing is to greatly increase 
the assumed noise statistics associated with the invalid measurement. By increasing 
the assumed measurement noise for the missing information, less confidence is placed 
on the measurement in the computation of the optimal Kalman gain. If the diagonal 
elements of the measurement noise covariance matrix R associated with the invalid 
measurements are increased to a large number (approaching infinity), this approach is 
equivalent to the sequential processing technique of merely skipping the incorporation 
of the invalid measurement into the measurement update for state estimate ~(k I k) and 
error covariance P(k I k). However, this technique is not restricted to sequential 
processing of measurements. Lynch and Figueroa (1991) [19] use this method to 
improve the robustness of ultrasonic position estimates in the presence of missing 
observations resulting from both structural intermittence and stochastic intermittence. 
Hardware Failure Detection and Isolation 
Terminology such as "fault tolerant control" is generally associated with the 
detection, isolation, and reconfiguration (FDIR) of the control algorithms in the event of 
sensor or actuator failures. Because of the possibility of sensor and actuator failures, 
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control system software often has the capability to gracefully degrade and avoid 
catastrophe immediately following the occurrence of a failure. The generation of 
residuals which develop a bias or exceed a threshold when a failure happens is one of 
the most basic concepts of these failure detection schemes. Therefore, we would 
expect that one or more of the redundant processes of a fault tolerant scheme would 
be involved in the generation of residual sequences for the purpose of testing for sensor 
and actuator failures. Thus, failure detection theories are available methods which 
would be applicable to the design of acceptance tests. There are more than five major 
survey papers concerning this area (Iserrnann, 1984) (Basseville, 1988) (Gertler, 1988) 
(Frank, 1990) (Willsky, 1976) (Panossian, 1988) [20-25] and several books. 
General Considerations 
Miscellaneous techniques which could be modified for use in an acceptance test 
exist throughout literature because difficult conditions, nonideal behavior, and limited 
resources have plagued digital controllers since the sixties. It is not the intent of this 
thesis to survey the general implementation issues which are covered in digital control 
textbooks. However, they do exist and are available to the interested reader. For 
instance, see Chapter 12 in Franklin, Powell, and Workman [26), Gelb [11], Chapter 11 
in Astrom [9], or H. Hanselmann's survey [27] concerning implementation of digital 
controllers. These references cover basics of hardware speeds and architectures, fixed 
point and floating point arithmetic, controller structures, sensors, problems such as 
parameter scaling and saturation, and introductions to software design and 
programming issues. A good example of the amount of information available, although 
generally not in one place, is the fact that Hanselmann's survey cites over 200 
references which in some way discuss implementation issues. 
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Detecting Computational Faults 
Within a fault tolerant computing scheme, the potential exists to confuse 
software failures with sensor or actuator failures. Especially when information 
generated by a process is used by other tasks or nodes to make failure detection 
decisions, it would be desirable to have confidence that information contained in 
residual processes has not been corrupted by faulty software. In some applications, 
results of calculations may not be correct even if the processor passes its hardware 
self-test and is still able to communicate to the other processors in the 
networked/distributed environment. Therefore, the problem is to find a method of 
encoding algorithms with redundant information such that abnormal residual or parity 
relations resulting from faulty calculations can be differentiated from sensor or 
actuator failures. An additional benefit of such a method is that corrupt information 
and software processes can be identified before the information is used by other 
processing nodes within the system, thus preventing unwanted actions based on faulty 
information. An efficient technique providing such features would be of considerable 
value to networked or distributed computing environments consisting of multiple 
processing nodes among which the overall control responsibilities have been divided. 
The next chapter discusses methodology for one potential technique. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOOOLOGY 
Subsequent chapters of this thesis are concerned with the developmen't of the 
software fault tolerance additions to the Bierman unuT error covariance algorithms. 
The Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFf) concept is used because it is a method of 
adding fault tolerance to matrix intensive calculations such as found in the Kalman 
filter. ABFf has the potential to be a method of verifying that consistent parameters 
have been input to the computational process and that the computation has been 
consistently performed for many types of control algorithms. Dormant software bugs, 
unexpected threads of execution, and inter-processor communication problems are a 
few of the situations that may be detectable. Also, the method is computationally 
cheaper than obtaining fault tolerance by using redundant processors and software 
coupled with a voting or a comparing scheme. This chapter concerns the specific 
methodologies used for adding software fault detection capabilities to the unuT error 
covariance algorithms. 
Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance 
Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFf) is a concept developed by Huang and 
Abraham (1984) [28]. ABFf is normally used in array processing or other instances of 
multiprocessing to provide uninterrupted and correct results regardless of the failure of 
individual processing elements. However, it also has a high probability of detecting 
computational failures in uniprocessor environments. Because recursive least squares 
parameter identification and the Kalman filter are examples of recursive algorithms 
which involve many matrix operations, one contribution of this thesis will be the 
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investigation of the benefits and drawbacks of applying ABFf concepts in these 
algorithms. 
Huang and Abraham developed the approach based on the concept of using 
matrix row and column checksums for detecting and correcting errors from within the 
confinement of the algorithms software. Background in Anfinson and Luk, 1988 [29], 
on the method is summarized as follows. Given nxn matrix A, nx(n+1) row checksum 
matrix Ar is defined as Ar = [A Ae], where e is nx1 vector e = [ 1, 1, ... , 1 ]T. By 
n 
comparing 2, aij and (Ae)i fori = 1, 2, ... , n, an error in the ith row of A can be 
j= 1 
detected. Similarly, given nxn matrix A, (n+l)xn column checksum matrix Ac is 
. defined as Ac=[ t]. By comparing f aij and (eTA)j for j = l, 2, ... , n, an 
e i = 1 
error in the jth column of A can be detected. A full (n+l)x(n+l) checksum matrix Af is 
defined as Af= [ A Ae ] . A column checksum matrix A multiplied by a 
eTA eTAe 
row checksum matrix B is a full checksum matrix AB. Also, when checksum matrices 
are added and subtracted they result in checksum matrices. For error detection in full 
checksum matrices, the location of one error in matrix A is found by intersection of 
inconsistent rows and columns. The single error may be corrected using either the 
inconsistent row or column. 
Anfinson and Luk [29] also explain how the weighted checksum approach from 
Jou and Abraham (1986) [30] can be used to locate more than one error. By creating d 
weighted checksum columns or rows, and assigning appropriate weights, a maximum 
of d errors can be detected and a maximum of (d/2) errors can be corrected. This was 
proved by Anfinson and Luk [29]. After defining unique nx1 weight vectors w<i), i = 
1, ... , d with unique elements Wj(i), j = 1, ... , n, the nx(n+d) weighted row checksum 
matrix is: 
Arw = [A Aw0) Aw(2) Aw(3) ... Aw(d) ]. 
The (n+d)xn weighted column checksum matrix is: 
A 
w(l)TA 
w(2)TA 
w(3)TA 
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An example given by Anfinson and Luk shows how the d = 2 case can be 
corrected using the weighted checksum approach. With the weights set as w(l) = e 
and w(2) = w, and assuming that an error is in element apq' then letting 
and 
n 
s1 = I, akq - (Ae)q 
i=l 
n 
s2 = I, wkakq - (Aw)q 
k=l 
(22) 
(23) 
will allow the error to be located. The error can be located in the (p,q) position of A 
because s2/s1 = wq. With the error located, apq can be corrected as apq +-- apq- s1. 
The selection of appropriate weights is an open area of research. 
Using ABFI' Techniques With the Kalman Filter 
ABFI' checksum matrix concepts can be used for a quantitative indication of 
consistency during each time step of the Kalman filter. The conventional form of the 
filter can be used to illustrate this point. Before performing the computational 
substeps of the filter, the consistency of time varying matrices passed to the filter can 
be checked by comparing the row or column checksum elements with the sum of the 
corresponding row or column. This check could be postponed until the end of the time 
steps computations if lost computing time resulting from a passed-in fault is 
allowable. The substeps of the filter are then performed with each substep including 
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the amount of ABFI' matrix operations and checks necessary for the desired level of 
fault detection. The following example Kalman filter equations have been modified for 
checksum matrix operations, but they do not provide the most complete fault coverage 
possible for each substep. However if the checksums of each system matrix are 
checked at the end of all substeps, a fault in any substep calculation would have a 
high chance of being detected. In the equations, matrix multiplications should be 
performed from left to right and vector e has an appropriate length for each particular 
multiplication. 
Computation of Kalman Gain 
(24) 
or 
(25) 
Conventional Measurement Update of Error Covariance 
Innovation Calculation for Measurement Update of State Estimate 
(27) 
State Estimate Measurement Update 
(28) 
24 
Time Propagation of State 
(29) 
Time Propagation of Error Covariance 
(30) 
As before, by comparing between . f Pij and (eTP)j, j = 1, 2, .. . , n, errors in the jth 
1 = 1 
column of the error covariance matrix can be detected after both the time propagation 
and measurement update portions of the calculations. Similar comparisons can be 
made for the results of the calculation of gain, innovations, state measurement update, 
and state time propagation. 
Additions to the Bierman UDUT Algorithms 
To further investigate the possibility of using ABFI' concepts in control 
algorithms, software fault detection capabilities based on ABFI' have been added to 
the Bierman uouT estimate error covariance factorization equations and tested using 
fault simulating software. The Bierman U-D covariance factorization algorithms were 
chosen because they are widely used in Kalman filter applications for the sequential 
processing of measurements, particularly when numerical precision is limited. While 
some users may argue that single precision processing is outdated, many applications 
still use single precision to obtain faster processing. Faster processing of basic 
algorithms allows extra CPU time for improvements such as the use of higher order 
models, more sensors, or failure detection and reconfiguration algorithms. 
From Thornton and Bierman [2t the basic idea for obtaining numerically stable 
time and measurement updates of the estimate error covariance (Equations (17) and 
(21)) is to propagate factors of the estimate error covariance matrix instead of the 
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matrix itself. The covariance matrix is factored into unit upper triangular matrix U 
and diagonal matrix 0 such that covariance matrix Pis 
P = UDUT. (31) 
Although several different algorithms exist for the time and measurement update of U-
D factors of the estimate error covariance, the following discussion concentrates on the 
Thornton and Bierman factorizations. Discussion on the specifics of the ABFT 
additions to the factorization algorithms follows the discussion of the basic 
algorithms. 
To begin, assume that the noise and system matrices vary with time such that 
tabulated and/ or steady state covariances cannot be precomputed and that Kalman 
gains must be computed in real-time. Once the initial covariance matrix is factored, 
the factors must be time propagated and then measurement updated at each time step. 
We begin with the time update algorithm and the software fault detection additions to 
the algorithm. In the remaining discussion, "k I k-1 or k+ 11 k and k I k" subscripts are 
dropped in favor of"-" and """designations consistent with the Thorton and Bierman 
publication. 
UDUT Time Update of the Error Covariance 
The time update algorithm time propagates the U-D factors of the error 
covariance and is a factorized version of the covariance calculation of Equation (21). 
The derivation of the algorithm begins by rewriting Equation (21) as Equation (32), 
with theW and DD matrices in terms of the U-0 factors of the error covariance. With 
appropriate matrices Wand DO, the matrix W is factored into upper triangular matrix 
D and orthogonal row matrix W as in Equation (33) such that W, W T and DO form D 
as in Equation (34). 
P=W(OO)WT (32) 
W=UW (33) 
(34) 
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According to Thornton and Bierman, when <1> is large or P is ill-conditioned, the 
computation of Equation (21) can have serious errors, thus giving motivation for the 
use of their algorithm. 
In terms of the 0 and IS factors prior to update, time updating is accomplished 
by forming matrices DD and W such that 
DD = diag(D, Q) (35) 
and 
(36) 
and then performing the factorization of W with a modified Gram-Schmidt 
orthogonalization of the rows of W. Keeping in mind the definitions that 
0, 0 T, L>, P, W, and W T are the matrices after time update, this orthogonalization is 
accomplished by starting with the last row of W, and progressively "D-
orthogonalizing" the remaining rows of W by subtracting out the "D-weighted" 
component of each row vector which is in the direction of the row currently being used 
to orthogonalize remaining rows. This method creates both the updated unit upper 
triangular matrix D (which is the transformation matrix) and matrix W which satisfy 
Equations (32), (33) and (34). 
The following definitions and equations are necessary for understanding the 
algorithm: 
1. Since f> is an nxn diagonal matrix and Q is an npxnp diagonal matrix, DO is 
an NxN diagonal matrix where N = n + np. 
2. Equation (21) is rewritten as Equation (32), 
(32) 
3. The modified Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of W uses a "D-weighted" 
inner product rather than an ordinary inner product, and a "D-weighted" inner product 
is defined as 
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(37) 
4. The modified type of orthogonalization which is performed on the rows of W 
is "D-orthogonalization," and two vectors are defined to be "D-orthogonal'' if 
(a,b)0 = 0. (38) 
5. Because after the orthogonalization of W, the rows Wi of W are "D-
orthogonal" to the columns WiT of W T for i ~ j, then 
where o is the Kronecker delta. 
6. As a result of Equation (39), 
D=W(DD)WT (40) 
where 
From Thorton and Bierman [2], the summary of the U-D Time Update Algorithm 
is repeated here to facilitate the discussion of the software fault detection additions to 
the algorithm. 
U-D Time Update Algorithm by Thorton and Bierman 
For j = n, n-1, . .. I 2 cycle through Equations (a) through (c). 
fj. = (w~n-J) w~n-]J) 
J J ' I DD (a) 
I t I I DD J • • 
. l=11···1 1. {
O(ij") = (w5n-J) w}n-J)) /D. } 
wt-J+U = wi<n-J)- U{i~J)Wr-J) r (b) and (c) 
D- _ (w<n-1) •. .ln-1)\ 1- 1 ' VVf IDD (d) 
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Software Fault Detection Additions to the Time Update Algorithm 
The following items describe how the UDUT time update algorithm was 
modified to include the ABFT additions. 
1. First, current time step system matrices and U and D factors from the 
measurement update of the error covariance must be input to the algorithm. Because 
of the ABFT modifications, the following checksum matrices were passed into the 
algorithm instead of matrices without checksums. For this effort, the checksums for 
these matrices are assumed to have been verified in the previous time steps 
measurement update algorithm, so no checksums were tested at the time the matrices 
were passed into the algorithm. 
Q 
0 
2. Form matrix W by calculating ct>O and a checksum verification as follows. 
a. [ <t>O 
eT<t>O 
NotCalc.l [ <I> ][ l 
- = --- 0 Oe 
eTct>Oe eT<l> . 
b. Check ~ ~ (<I>U)(i,j) versus e Tct>Oe. 
I 
3. Form DD= 
DO 
OQ 
0 
B 
0 
eTQe + eTf>e 
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4. Factor W using the modified Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization algorithm into 
OW. Every time a vector component 0(i,j)Wi(n-j) is subtracted from a row Wi(n-j) of 
W, also subtract the same amount from the column checksum row eTW such that the 
column checksums are always current. 
5. Reset the row checksum's for U to zero in 
and as each W rows 0 basis transformation coefficients O(i,j) are created, add the 
element to the row checksum column of 0 as soon as the coefficient is calculated. 
6. Reset the checksum forD and as each element Oi is calculated, update the 
diagonal elements checksum e TOe, where e TOe is part of the matrix 
7. Finally, verify that the row or column checksums are consistent with the row 
or column elements of each of following matrices. This is accomplished by summing 
row or column elements and making a direct comparison with the row or column 
checksum. 
a. Check column checksums (e TW)i versus 1: W(i,j). 
I 
b. Check <Oe)i versus k U(i,j). 
J 
c. Check e TQe +e Toe versus l: DD(j). 
J 
d. Check (eTDe) versusl: D(j). 
J 
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Table 1 summarizes the number of operations required before the modification 
and the number of operations added by the modification for a comparison of the 
overhead required by the ABFf additions. Table 2 contains calculations of the 
percentage increase in computational overhead which is caused by the ABFf 
addidtions for several different system order sizes. The values in Table 2 illustrate 
how the percentage overhead resulting from the ABFf additions decreases significantly 
as the number of state variables increase. 
uouT Measurement Update of the Error Covariance 
The measurement update algorithm concerns the calculations involved in 
updating the U-D factors of the estimate error covariance given the a priori state 
estimate 
xklk-l=x, 
estimate error covariance 
- -.,..,.-r 
Pklk-1 = P = UuU 
(41) 
(42) 
and a scalar measurement with zero mean normally distributed noise with covariance 
R. It performs a factorized version of the covariance calculation of equation (17), and 
results in the error covariance P for the minimum variance estimate :X = Xk 1 k· As a 
byproduct, the algorithm also generates an n-state normalized Kalman gain vector. 
Similar to the way the time update algorithm is derived by first rewriting Equation (21) 
in terms of D and D factors of P, the derivation of Bierman's measurement update 
algorithm starts by rewriting Equation (17) in terms of the factors D and D of P. This 
rewritten equation has a special structure which can be exploited to form the D and D 
factors of P = 000 r. Using nomenclature from the Thornton and Bierman 
publication, it can be verified that Equation (17) can be rewritten as 
(43) 
TABLE 1 
OPERATION COUNTS FOR THE STANDARD TIME 
UPDATE ALGORITHM AND ABFT ADDITIONS 
Algorithm Adds Multiplies Divides Logic 
MWGSU-D 1.5n3 + 0.5n2 1.5n3 + 2n2- n-1 [2] 
+ n2np + 0.5n + 
(0.5n2 - O.Sn)"' (n2 + n)np + 
(n2- n)"' 
ABFT 0.5n3 + 3n2 + 0.5n2 + 0.5n 0 
ADDITIONS 3.5n + np + 1 
TOMWGS +np(0.5n2 + 
U-D 0.5n) 
"'Variance matrix formed. 
TABLE 2 
COMPUTATIONAL COSTS FOR THE ABFT ADDITIONS IN 
TERMS OF A PERCENT AGE OF ORIGINAL OPERATIONS 
FOR THE TIME UPDATE ALGORITHM 
0 
5 
State Variables Adds Multiplies Divides Logic Overall 
(n) 
10 54% 3% 0% N/A 27% 
50 37% 0.7% 0% N/A 19% 
100 35% 0.3% 0% N/A 18% 
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where 
fT =HD , 
g=L>f <gi=OA i=l, ... ,n>, 
a= R + f g.f. 
i=l II. 
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(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
From Thornton and Bierman, the bracketed term in Equation (43) is positive semi-
definite and can be factored as UDUT. Because the product of unit upper triangular 
matrices is unit upper triangular, 
D = OV. (47) 
and 
(48) 
As previously mentioned, it is the special structure of the bracketed term in Equation 
(43) which is exploited to createD and D. Given that 
unoT = 0-0/a)ggT, (49) 
it can be rewritten as 
t o.o<Oo<OT = t D·e·er -(1/a)ggT, 
i=l I i=l Ill 
(50) 
where 
(51) 
(52) 
D(i) - ITr(i) u-(i) 1 0 O)T 
-\U} t• ••f j-}1 I ,. • •I I (53) 
and ei is a null vector with the exception of a unit value for the i-th element. From this 
point the derivation shows that the Ui and Di components can be determined in a 
backward recursive fashion for i = n, n-1, ... , 1 as depicted in the following equation, 
where 
.Jl. ,.. T (n) (n)T _ - - -T - - -T i~1 Dieiei -cnv v -DnUnUn + Dn-1Un-1Un-1 
n-2 ,., 
+ (i~ Dieie(-cn-2V(n-2)v(n-2JI) 
Dn = Dn<an-1/an) 
ai = R + ± gkfk, i = 1, ... ,n k=1 
yn-1 = (g1, ... ,gn-1'0) T 
u<n) = -(fn/ an-1)gi, i = 1, ... , n-1, 
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(54) 
(55) 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
but the derivations to get to the final algorithm are lengthy and the interested reader is 
refered to Thorton and Bierman. From Thorton and Bierman [2], the summary of the 
U-D measurement update algorithm is also repeated to facilitate the discussion of the 
software fault detection additions to the algorithm. 
U-D Measurement Update Algorithm By Bierman 
For j = 1, ... , n cycle through Equations (c) through (h): 
a(= aj-1 + f%i llo = R 
(j-dimensional partial-state innovations variance) 
D(= (ai_1/ ai)Di (6 (= T5 i if aj = 0) 
(diagonal element fractional update) 
V(=gj 
A.:=- f/ ai-1 ().. := 0 if ai-1 = 0) 
(• For j = 1, (f) not included.) 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Fori= 1, ... , j-1 compute recursively (g) and (h): 
a···= a-·+ v·l IJ" 1) I 
(update of column j of the U matrix factor) 
v ··= V·+ U··V· I' I IJ } 
(j-dimensional partial state normalized gain) 
(*For j = 1, (g) and (h) not included.) 
Software Fault Detection Additions to the 
Measurement Update Algorithm 
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The following items describe how the uouT measurement update algorithm was 
· modified to include the ABFT additions. 
1. First, current time step system matrices and U and D factors from the time 
update of the error covariance must be input to the algorithm. Because of the ABFT 
modifications, the following checksum matrices were passed into the algorithm instead 
of matrices without checksums. For this effort, the checksums for these matrices are 
assumed to have been verified in the previous time steps time update algorithm, so no 
checksums were tested at the time the matrices were passed into the algorithm. 
0 
0 
2. In the first step of the algorithm, Equation (a), the vector fT is formed. The 
ABFT addition to this step consisted of the multiplication of the column checksum 
matrix for H (even though His a vector in this case) by the row checksum matrix for 0 
as follows, 
[ 
fT 
Not Calc. 
Not Calc.] [ H l er~re = ~iH 0 : Oe · (60) 
Verification of the checksum was delayed until the end of the algorithm. 
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3. In the second step of the algorithm, Equation (b), the vector g is formed. The 
ABFf addition to this step consisted of the formation and update of a checksum for g 
as each element of g was calculated. Verification of the checksum was performed near 
the end of the algorithm. 
4. The checksum for 0 was checked following Equation (b) by comparing 
~ Di versus eToe. (61) 
5. While cycling through Equations (c) through (h) for j = 1, ... , n, a checksum 
for ex was created and updated by adding each exj as they were calculated. 
Verification with a duplicate copy of the current alpha is performed at the end of 
Equation (h) at each value of j, and a verification of the checksum for ex is performed 
at the end of the algorithm. 
6. While cycling through Equations (c) through (h) for j = 1, ... , n, at each 
fractional update of D in Equation (d), the previous value of Dj was subtracted and 
the new value of Dj was added to the checksum for D as follows, 
eToe = eTJSe- f>i + (ai-1/ai)Di (62) 
Verification of the checksum was performed at the end of the algorithm. 
7. Although a software fault for A was not simulated, the algorithm changes 
included keeping duplicate copies of A in separate memory locations, and then 
performing a comparison when the current value would no longer need to be used at 
the end of Equation (h) for each value of j. 
8. Similarly, although a software fault for Vj was not simulated, the algorithm 
changes included keeping duplicate copies of Vj in separate memory locations, and 
then performing a comparison when the current value would no longer need to be used. 
Also, a checksum for v was created and updated as each element of v was changed in 
Equation (h). 
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9. As each viA. increment was added to the U(i,j) elements in equation (f), the 
row checksum column DeforD was updated, 
Verification of the checksum was performed at the end of the algorithm. 
10. Finally, the algorithm verifies that the row or column checksums are consistent 
with the row or column elements of each of following matrices. This is accomplished 
by summing row or column elements and making a direct comparison with the row or 
column checksum. 
a. Check eTg versus l: gi. 
I 
b. Check (Oe)i versus~ 0(i,j). 
J 
c. Check e TfT versus l: fr 
I 
d. Check (e Toe) versus I: D(j). 
J 
e. Check a checksum. 
f. Check e Tv versus ~ vi. 
I 
Table 3 summarizes the number of operations required before the modification 
and the number of operations added by the modification for a comparison of the 
overhead required by the ABFT additions to the measurement update algorithm. Table 
4 contains calculations of the percentage increase in computational overhead which is 
caused by the ABFT addidtions for several different system order sizes. Again, the 
values in Table 4 illustrate how the percentage overhead resulting from the ABFT 
additions decreases significantly as the number of state variables increase. 
TABLE 3 
OPERATION COUNTS FOR THE STANDARD MEASUREMENT 
UPDATE ALGORITHM AND ABFT ADDITIONS 
Algorithm Adds Multiplies Divides Logic 
U-D Factor- o.sn2 + (1.Sn2 + n-1 0 
ization [2] 1.5n)m + S.Sn)m + 
(O.Sn2 - O.Sn)• (n2- n)• 
ABFT (1.Sn2 + tun 0 (3n +7)m 
additions to 11.5n)m 
U-D 
Factorization 
•variance matrix formed. 
TABLE 4 
COMPUTATIONAL COSTS FOR THE ABFT ADDITIONS IN 
TERMS OF A PERCENTAGE OF ORIGINAL OPERATIONS 
FOR THE MEASUREMENT UPDATE ALGORITHM 
State Variables Adds Multiplies Divides Logic Overall 
(n) 
10 161% 5% 0% N/A 84% 
so 113% 1% 0% N/A 58% 
100 107% 0.6% 0% N/A 54% 
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CHAPTER IV 
SIMULATIONS 
Simulation Environment 
To test the software fault detection methods, an RTOS software implementation 
of the uouT Kalman filter (Thornton and Bierman (1977)) error covariance update 
algorithms with the ABFf modifications was developed. Rather than developing 
Matlab code which simulated a real-time multitasking operating system, the filtering 
algorithms with ABFf modifications were coded and run entirely in the VxWorks real-
time operating system environment. This software implementation is included in the 
Appendix. If the simulations had been performed in Matlab, the introduction of faults 
into the calculations and the fault locations would have been pre-determined. 
However, by performing the simulation directly in the VxWorks environment, the faults 
were allowed to happen in a non-exact periodic fashion with all the timing 
irregularities of the pre-emptive priority based and multi-tasking operating system. 
Faults were simulated by creating a rogue task which periodically corrupted informa-
tion in shared memory being used by the covariance update tasks. The rogue routine 
was created so that the user could control the periodicity, value and location of the 
fault. Using the algorithm modifications previously discussed, the error covariance 
factorization algorithms were able to independently and immediately detect simulated 
faults as they occurred. The simulated faults are representative of errors which might 
result from external environments, corrupt communication with external processors, 
software faults, and/ or memory and logic chip MTBF failures. The software is coded 
in "C". 
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The OSU College of Engineering Interdisciplinary Real Time Distributed Systems 
Laboratory was used to simulate the proposed techniques. The simulation used a 
VME-based system with a Heurikon Motorola 68040 microprocessor-based single 
board computer utilizing the VxWorks real time operating system kernel, with cross 
development performed on a Sun Spare workstation. Matlab compatible data files 
were transferred via file transfer protocol (FfP) from the Heurikon computer to a 
engineering college RS6000 computer. On the RS6000, a matlab script file with an 
embedded UNIX C-shell "sleep" command was made to periodically form the 
covariance matrix elements from the U-D factors stored in the data files, display plots 
of the Kalman gains and covariances for 100 time step frames, write the plots to a 
uniquely named postscript file, and then remove the used data files before arrival of 
the next frames data. The displays were remotely plotted on the Sun Spare work-
station being used for cross development. 
Results 
Figures 4 through 29 are representative plots of the effects of the simulated faults 
on the error covariance and Kalman gain calculations for a second-order system. 
Seven different cases are represented. Six cases are shown with time frames from 0 to 
100 time steps and 100 to 200 time steps, and one case in Figures 12 through 13 is 
shown for the time frame from 0 to 100 time steps. The following second-order system 
parameters and noise covariances were used in the simulations. 
<I> - [ 1.0 0.02] 
- 0 1.00 
R = 0.1 
Q = 0.01 
H = [1.0 0.0} 
and 
B = G =[~:8] (63) 
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For each case, the initial starting time of the periodic faults affecting the calculations 
was delayed 40 to 70 steps to facilitate plotting and to avoid any confusion with the 
filter's startup period. As can be seen in the plots, this delay allowed the filter to 
reach its steady state values before being corrupted by faults. In a real-time 
application, a fault could occur at any time, including the startup period. 
When the period of fault occurrence is very fast, such as 1 time step in the first 
two cases shown in Figures 4 through 7 and Figures 8 through 11, the covariance and 
gain calculations take on erroneous values. In the first case, which is shown in Figures 
4 through 11, all erroneous values are fairly constant. In the second case, which is 
shown in Figures 8 through 11, the erroneous values of the Kalman gains are fairly 
constant, but the value for the second diagonal element of the covariance matrix is 
increasing with time. Also note in Figures 10 and 11 that the timing of the fault in the 
first element of D occasionally causes a spike in the calculation of the first diagonal 
element of P for some time steps. Although Figures 10 and 11 are the only figures 
presented which show this spike behavior when forming the covariance matrix P, the 
behavior was often found when simulating faults in other variables. Thus, faults can 
cause erroneous gains and covariances with either transient, fairly constant or 
increasing behaviors. Note that the "error type" shown in the figures is a number which 
corresponds to the locations in the software where the fault was first detected, but 
does not indicate whether the value is steady or transient. In regard to the remaining 
cases, as the period of the fault increases from once every 1 step to once every 15 steps 
in the case of Figures 12 and 13, and then to once every 70 steps in the other four cases 
in Figures 14 through 29, the algorithms react as if they have been reset with new initial 
conditions following the occurrence of each fault. With enough time between faults, the 
Kalman gains and covariance return to steady-state values. They return to steady-
state values because state matrices and noise covariances were kept constant during 
the simulation so that effects of the fault could be illustrated separately from effects 
caused by varying system parameters or noise. Even though the calculations return to 
steady-state values, the important observation is that the erroneous Kalman gains 
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resulting from the faulty calculations will likely cause incorrect state estimates, 
incorrect control actions, and unrecoverable system instabilities if corrective action is 
not taken upon immediate detection of a faulty calculation. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Future control systems need to exhibit increasingly better software fault 
tolerance. Systems which have human safety requirements, such as the automated 
highway system, are obvious examples of systems which will require software fault 
tolerance. With these types of systems in mind, concepts of software fault tolerance 
such as the Distributed Recovery Block scheme were reviewed in the context of control 
system applications. Several previously developed methods for identifying failures 
and maintaining suboptimal performance of control algorithms have been recast as 
candidate elements for the acceptance test in software fault tolerance schemes. In 
particular, the following conclusions can be made from the work of this thesis. 
Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) techniques were shown to have the 
potential for use as quantitative measures for computation acceptance at the end of 
each time step of recursive estimation algorithms such as the Kalman Filter. To test the 
method, Bierman's UDUT covariance factorization algorithms were modified to 
include ABFT methods and test cases were run with simulated faults. Faults causing 
erroneous Kalman gains and covariances with transient, fairly constant and/or 
increasing behaviors were immediately detected by the algorithm modifications. 
Operation counts for the ABFT modifications to the algorithms were tabulated versus 
the original operation counts. The required overhead of the modifications was 
tabulated as a percentage of the original algorithm operations for system orders of 10, 
50, and 100 state variables. The overhead of the proposed algorithms is 
approximately 25% of the original operation count for the time update algorithm and 
60% for the measurement update algorithm. Because the overhead is less than that 
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required to run a duplicate process of the unmodified algorithms, the method may be 
particularly applicable when physically redundant processors are not desirable or 
available. An additional benefit of the modifications concerns the isolation of system 
faults to system components. The elimination of software faults (resulting from 
computing environment failures) as causes of large residual sequences is desirable 
when sensor and actuator failure detection decisions are being made. In addition, for 
implementations in which system matrices are passed as parameters into filter 
routines, checksum matrices provide an additional method of validating that the 
matrices are consistent and have been passed without corruption. 
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linclude •stdloLlb.h" 
flnclude "loLib.h• 
tinclude "taskLlb.h• 
tlnclude "wdLlb.h" 
finclude •a out.h• 
tlnclude "s'trLlb.h" 
finclude •tioLib.h" 
t1nclude •vme.h• 
tlnclude- "lflath.h" 
I* macro's *I 
I define mmln(a, b) ( ((a) < (bll? (a): (bl) 
Ide tine mmax (a, b) ( ((a) < (b) I? (b): (a) 1 
ldeflne abs(xl (((xl > 0.) ? (x):-(x)) 
ft task oriented definitions *I 
ldef!ne STACKS!U 5000 
1• A./0 de!initlons •1 
ldeflne MAX SNGL ENDED CHANNELS 32 
ldef!ne MAX-DIFF-CHANNELS 16 
Ide t1 ne MAX =PAST= MEASUREMENTS 50 
I • ABFT USUAGE 
ldeflne EPSILON 
'I 
0.00001 
I* Definitions tor Direct D1q1tal Control code seqrnents. •1 
ldef!ne TICKS PER SEC 60 
lde[!ne PI - - 3.1415926535891932384 
tdeflne STATES 6 /"' (maximum number of states n) 
tde!1ne INPUTS 6 1• (maximum number o! inputs) ,.. 
Ide fine MEAS 6 
ldeflne PROCESS NOISE 6 
ldeflne MEAS NOISE 6 
ldeflne ID - 10 
/* Global Measurements */ 
double y (MAX_SNGL_ENDED _Cf!ANNE!.S) !MAX_PAST_MEASUREMENTS): 
t 1 *I 
•I 
/* System Global Parameter& */ 
double ph If STATES II STATES 1: 
double 9atnma[STATES) [INPUTS); 
double PI STATES I I STATES I; 
double U(STATES) [STATES); 
double D[STATES); 
double DD(STATES+PROCESS NOISE); 
double H[MEAS) [STATES); -
double WISTATES) [STATES+PROCESS_NOISE); 
double diMEAS)IINPUTS); 
double X (STATES] i 
double ~[STATES) [MEAS); 
double R[MEAS NOISE); 
double Q[PROCESS NOISE); 
double G(STATES)fPROCESS_NOISE); 
double rogue_ value; 
1nt states; 
tnt process noise; 
int meas noise; 
int meas; 
lnt rogue delay; 
lnt roque=start; 
int !ault _type; 
char go_on; 
fiLE •fpErrorl; 
FIL£ •tpKgaln; 
FILE • fpU; 
riLE '[p0; 
I,.."',..,.* • .,.., • •• * ••••tt •• *• ,..., •• •• •• •"' * • .,. ** ** • ••• ,.,. * • •• •• •• ••"" ,.. • • •• *" * • .,. I 
1.. NC»1ENCLATURE: .. I 
1u Time varylnQ linear system: ,.,/ 
1.. x(k+l) • phi•x(k) + qamma 11 u t G111 q ••1 
!"'• y•H•xtd•u+r 11111 / 
/,., Vectors and Matrlcies: ••1 
1 11111 y - vector of measurements, (mxl) .. / 
I'" u- vector of control inputs, (lxl) ·-; 
!*• q- process noise, (pxl) Hf 
/** r - measurement nolse, (mxl) u; 
1 11111 r and q are mutually uncorrelated jointly Gaussian white noise ••1 
I* • sequences. 
/,.. H - observation matrix tmxn) 
J·H phi - state transition matrix, (nxn) 
I"* qantll'la - control input matrix, {nxl) 
1.. G - (nxp) 
1 11111 x - vector of states 
1u K - kalman gain vector 
/ 11111 P - oriqinal covariance matrix 
t•• U - U factor of covarianc-e P • UDU' 
;u D - o !actor of covariance P • uoo· 
..I 
.. I 
.. I 
.. I 
.. I 
"I 
"I 
"I 
.. I 
.. I 
I.. R- Measurement noise covariance m.atrix, positive deflnlte tmxm) .. I 
t•• (vector of diagonal elements) 11 •/ 
/~~* 0 - Process no1.se c:ovarlance, positive sem1det1n1te (pxp) .,./ 
1• • • *I 
/.. x{O) is multivariate Gaussianf with mean mx(OJ and covariance 
1,.. Px(OI. X(O) .... N(K(O);mx(O),Px(O)), 
.. I 
.. I 
1···········,.·······················~~···11·······~~····11·················1111/ 
SEM_to sem_systern; 
" ~
SEH 10 en t 1m• etep •ync; 
SEM-ID•em-updt't -
SEM=ID sem=:w_DD; 
1• talk ldantlUcatlona */ 
lnt tldl; 
int tid2; 
1nt tldl; 
lnt tid4; 
lnt tld5; 
tnt t1d6r 
/* file descriptors */ 
1 nt fdl 
1 nt fd2 
1 nt !d3 
lnt td4 
/*decl•ratlon of subroutines*/ 
void filter lnltO; 
void sya pal-" am updt 0; 
void simUlator-(); 
lnt mea• updt (); 
lnt ud factor 0: 
int ud-factor propO; 
void task killer(); 
lloat qet -t !me 0: 
void printm 0; 
void prlntv 0: 
void cont (); 
void stop 0: 
void start me 0 ; 
void roque(}; 
void abft _check 0 : 
, ........................................ _ .................................... , 
, .. filter inlt 0 is the entry point !or a filter spawned by **/ 
, .. a startup routine or function. ""'I 
/**modification history **/ 
/** -------------------- ••! 
/"* 02a, 19may93, mrm added fault type to errorl output ••; 
!*• 02b, 27may93, mrm added DEBUG-lfde!' s for print! statements **/ 
, ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• "*"*·············••! 
void filter In! t 0 
I -
tnt t 1me step, inde.x by 100, k, j, l; 
lnt abft=error,error=fliq, error_type; 
error t laq • FALSE; 
error~ type .. FALSE; 
abft error • FALSE;-
lndeH by 100•0; 
ttme_SteP - 0; 
lam (•moan•, •un1xcshell 11 ); 
1!! lfp~galn•fopen I" rsf: /u/moan/ rs6000/Kgal n. m•, "w"Jl ••NULL) 
printf("'\n Kqaln.m !open falled.\n•); 
1 f ( (fpU•fopen ( 11 rat: IU/moan/ rs6000/UpperP .m"', •w•)) ••NULL} 
print!("'\n UpperP.m !open falled.\n•); 
It ( (tpO•fopen I" rof: /u/moan/u6000/DioqP .m•, "w"Jl ••NULL) 
prlntt(•\n DlaQP.m !open falled.\n•); 
1 f { {fpErrorl•topen (•rs!: /u/moanlrs6000/errorl.m•, •w•) ) ••NULL) 
print! (•\n errorl.m Copen failed. \n•): 
taskDelay (10); 
11 !de f DEBUG 
1• Print out P "'! 
printf ("Printlnq P(O) \n"); 
prlntm (P, states., states); 
prlntf(•\n•); 
tendlf DEBUG 
/* Initialize fault detection information to NULL state 
fprlntf (fpErrorl, "'\n error type • 0;\n•J; 
fprlntf UpErrorl, '"\n time_ Or_ error • o; \n'"); 
/* Initialize fault type information !or plottlnq */ 
*I 
fprintf ffpEt:rorl, ""\n fault. type • td ;\n 11 , fault type): 
fpr1ntf(fpE:rrorl,"\n roque-start • td ;\n•, rogue start) 
tprlntf(!pErrorl,•\n roque-delay- td ;\n"', roque-delay) 
fprlntf(fpErrorl, .. \n roque=value • 't ;\n•, rogue=value) 
I* Print PO to Upper.m •; 
fprint!(!pU,"\nPO•( \n .. ); 
tor(k•O; k < states;k.H) 
I 
tor (j•O; j < states; j++) 
( 
fpr!ntflfpU,"H •, P{klilll; 
); 
!prlntf (!pU, •; \n"l; 
); 
fprlnttl!pU,"I: \n"); 
flfdef DEBUG 
I* Print out phi •/ 
prlntf(•Printlnq phi\n•); 
prl ntm (phi 1 st at es, states) : 
prlnt!l"\n"l; 
fendif DEBUG 
fprlntflfpU,"\nphl•{ In"); 
for(k•O; k < states;k+t} 
( 
for(j•O; j < states;jt+l 
I 
!prlntf(fpU,"H •, phi {kl llll: 
1: 
!printf(fpU 1 '"; \n"'}; 
I; 
!print! (fpU, • I: \n"J: 
11 !de f DEBUG 
I* Print out R */ 
prlntf( 11 Pr1ntJng R\n""); 
prlntv(R,meas noise); 
print f t•\n"') ~-
fend! f DEBUG 
!print! {!pU, •\nR- { \n""); 
!or(k•O: k < meas nolse;k+•l 
I - '-I U1 
tprintt(tpu,•u •, R!kll~ 
fprlntf(fpU,•~ \n") ~ 
); 
fprlntf(fpU,•I; \n•); 
abtt_error • ud_factor (); 
I* Evaluate fault status and report to errorLm if TRUE •t 
It (error tla9 •• FALSE) 
I -
1r (abft error ! • FALSE) 
{ -
1: 
lltdef DEBUG 
error !lao .. TRUE; 
error-type • ab!t error; 
fprlntftfpErrorl,;;\ntlme of error • 'd ;\n", time step); 
fpr1ntf(!p£rrori,•\nerror_tfpe • 'd ;\n•, error_tYpe); 
); 
I* Print out U */ 
prlnt!C'"Printinq factored U{O)\n'"); 
prlntm (U, states, states,; 
printf ("\n"l ~ 
tend!! DEBUG 
fprintt (fpU, "\nU• ( \n") ~ 
tor (k•O; k < states;k++) 
I 
for (j•O; j < states; jt+-) 
I 
); 
Hlk •• 11 
I 
!print! (fpU, "1.0 "); 
) 
else 
fprlntf(!pU,•H •, U(ki(JJI; 
); 
tprintf (fpU, •; \n•); 
tl!def DEBUG 
I* Print out D */ 
print! ("Print lng factored D (01\n"); 
prlntv (O, •tates); 
prl nt f 1"\n"); 
tendit DEBUG 
fprlntt(fpO,"\nD•( \n"); 
for(k•O; k < states;k++) 
( 
fprlntf(fpD,"H •, D{k)); 
I ~ 
fprlntf(fpO,•; \n"); 
I* Start Printing out Kalman Gains */ 
fprlnt!(fpKgaln, "\nK•I \n"); 
tor (k•O; k < states; k,..+J 
' fprlnt!(!pKQaln,•\f •, K(kl (0)); ); 
fprintf (fpKqaln,•: \n..,); 
tor II: I 
semTake (sem_t1me_step_lync); 
It~ loop tor multiple measurements to be added here 
I* for (l-0; 1 < meas; 1++) 
I' I 
I* validate_meas(); 
1•0; 
semTake (sem_system); 
abft_error•meas_updt (l); 
'I 
*I 
'I 
*I 
I* Evaluate fault status and report to errorl .m 1! TRUE 
If (error flag •• FALSE) 
I -
1 t (abft error ! • FALS£) 
I -
'I 
error tlao .. TF.UE; 
error-type- ab!t error; 
fprtnt"t(!pErrorl,;\ntlme of error- 'd ;\n"', time step); 
fprintt (!p£rrorl, •\nerror tYpe • 'd ;\n .. ~ error tyPe); 
I; -· -
tlldef DEBUG 
tend! f DEBUG 
); 
1• Print out U t.l 
print f t•Printinq me.as_updt U\n•); 
prlntm (U, states, states); 
prlntft"\n"l; 
lf(l -- 01 
I 
for {k•O; k < states; k++) 
' for ( j•O; j < states; j++} 
); 
I 
if (k -- j) 
I 
fprlntf(fpU, "1.0 "I; 
I 
else 
fprlntf(fpU,•tt •,U(klllli; 
); 
fpr1ntf(fpU,•; \n"); 
J; 
llfdef DEBUG 
1• Print out D *I 
lendlt DEBUG 
prlntf(•Prlnt1nq meas updt D\n•); 
print v (0, states); -
print! ("\n"l; 
1!(1 -- 0) 
I 
for (k•O; k < states;k,..t) 
I 
fprlntf(!pD,"'f .. , D(kJ); 
]; 
fprlntt (fpD, •; \n"l; 
); ...., 
"' 
Hfdef DEBUG 
I* Prlnt out K *I 
prlntf t•PrlntlnQ Kalman Gain Vector 1<.\n"); 
prlntm(K,states, 1); 
Iandi! DEBUG 
print! ("\n"); 
1f(l -- 0) 
I 
for(k•O: k < states;k++J 
I 
fprlntt (fpKqaln,•H •, K(kl (01); 
I; 
fprlnt t (fpKg:aln, •; \n•); 
); 
/*allow sys param udpt to update the system parameters •t 
/*if new values are available*/ 
semGlve (sem_system): 
, ........................................................................... ····; 
/** Comment is a stub for sequent lal state estimation update for each 
I** measurement to be placed herea 
• 'I 
••; 
, ..... ,. ..... "****"**•·················· .. ··························-··········t 
I'' '*I 
aemTake (sem system); 
abft_error : ud_factor_prop(); 
I* Evaluate f.ault status and report to errorl.m if TRUE 
if (error flaQ -- FALSE) 
I -
1 f (abft error ! • FALSE) 
I -
., 
error flaq - TRUE; 
error-type • abtt error; 
fprlnt"f{fpErrorl, ;\ntlme of error • 'd ;\n•, tirne step); 
fprlntf(fpErrorl,•\nerror tyPe- 'd ;\n"', error tYpe); 
); - -
) ; 
I lfde! DEBUG 
1• Print out U */ 
print! ("'Printing time propogated U\n"'); 
prlntm (U, states, states,; 
prlntf ("\n"); 
lend! f DEBUG 
flfdef DEBUG 
J• Print out D •t 
print! ("PrlntlnQ time propagated D\n"); 
prlntv (0, states); 
prlntf ("'\n"'); 
fend! f DEBUG 
, ............................... - ................................... * •• ,.. .................. , 
I** Comment is a stub tor time propoqatlng the state vector to the .. , 
t•• next t1m.e step. (prediction of state at t (k+l) .. / 
1.. Hay also be qood place for control law calculations ""/ 
, ................................ ,..,. ............................................. , 
seMCive (sem_aystem); 
;···········································································! 
,., Since global system data ts protected by sem system., this could .,, 
;u Allow sys param updt ' control laws to proc8ed sending information **/ 
/* ............. ; •• -····· ...................................................... , 
H ltlme_step •• 100) 
I 
fprlntf (fpU, "I; \n"); 
!prlntflfpO,"I; \n"); 
fprintf{!p!C:galn, •J; \n"}; 
tpr1ntf{t'pU, "'\n lndexlOO .. •); 
fprlntf(fpU, "'d ; \n", lndex_by_lOO); 
print! ("'\n indexlOO - "'); 
printf("'td; \n•,tndex._by~l00); 
++index_ by _1 00: 
time_step - 1; 
lam t•moan•, •unixcshe ll "') ; 
lf ((!close (fpU)) •• EOF) 
print! ("'\n fpU !close failed. \n"); 
1 t ((!close (fpD)) •• EO f) 
pr1ntt(•\n fpD fclose failed.\n•); 
lf(l!close(fpKqaln)) •• EOF') 
print! (•\n fpKqain fclose fat led. \n"); 
If I (fclose lfpErrorl)) •• EOF) 
print! ("'\n !pE:rrorl !close failed. \n"); 
1 f ( ( !p)(ga ln•fopen (" rs !: /u/moan/rs6000/KQa 1 n .m•, •w•) } ••NULL) 
pr1ntt(•\n Kgain.m fopen failed.\n•); 
l! ( I !pU•!open (" rsf: /u/moan/ rs6000/UpperP. m•, "w")) ••NULL) 
printf(•\n UpperP.tn fopen !ailed.\n'"); 
HI ( !pD•fopen I" rs t: /u /moan/ rs6000/0iaqP .m••, "w"))- •NULL) 
prlntfl"\n DlaQP,m !open falled.\n"); 
1 t { (fpErrorl- !open ( .. rsf: /u/moan/rs6000/er ror 1 .m•, •w•) ) ••NULl,) 
print f ("\n errorl.m. !open failed. \n"); 
/* Initialize fault detection information to NULL state */ 
fpr1nt!(fpErrorl,•\n error type .. 0;\n"l; 
fpr:lntf(fpErrorl,"'\n time_Of_error ... O; \n•); 
/* In1t1alize fault type information for plottlnq */ 
!printf(fpErrorl,"'\n fault type"" 'd ;\n"', fault type): 
fpdntf(fpErrorl,"'\n roque~stan • 'd \n"', roque start) 
fpr1ntf(fp£rrorl,'"\n roque-delay • 'd \n"', roque-delay) 
fprintf(fpErrorl,•\n rogue=value- '( \n•, roque=value) 
error tlaQ • fALSE 
error-type • fALSE 
abft_error • FALSE 
fprlntf(tpU,"\n U•l \n"); ....., 
....., 
fprlntf(fpO,"\n D•( \n"); 
fprlntf (fpKq&ln, "\n K·( \n"); 
el•e 
I 
); 
++time_&tEip; 
); 
I***" •• "'*"'********* ******** *" •••• ** •••• •• •••• *' •" •• ** "'* ** •• •• ** * • • * •• •• •• I 
, .. ays pJ~ram updt() is lp&wned to update system parameter when u/ 
I* • nec8aa&ry: "'*/ 
/** ••t 
/*"'modification history *"/ 
I* • -------------------- ••! 
;u Ola, 12m.ay93, mrm added stuff for alqorlthm based fault "'/ 
;u tolerance. .., I 
,.. **/ 
, ................................................. " .......................... , 
void sys param updt 0 
I - -
tnt Btiltes but; 
int procesS noise buf; 
int meas noise buf; 
Lnt meas -but; -
int j,k;-
double ph! bull STATES) (STATES); 
double gamma bu((STATESI (INPUTS); 
double P but( STATES) [STATES); 
double U-buf[STATESI(STATES); 
double D-buf[STATESJ; 
double DO bu! (STATES+ PROCESS NOISE J; 
double H buf{MEASJ(STATES); -
double W-buf[STATESI [STATES+PROCESS NOISE!; 
double d-buf[HEASJ(INPUTS); -
double X -buf{STATES); 
double K-buf{STATES] {MEAS); 
double R-buf{MEAS NOISE]; 
double Q-buf{PROCESS NOISE!; 
double G=buf[STATESJ(P~OCESS_NOISEJ; 
for(; ;I 
I 
1• This pa:rt is a stub !or readlnQ new parameters lnto a buffer 
I" when a messaqe or interrupt is sent to slqnal that new 
1• parameters are available~ 
semTake (sem updt) ~ 
states but-2; 
procesS noise buf•l; 
meas noise buf•l; 
meas=buf•lT 
phi buf(OJ (01•1.0; 
phi-buf{l!IO!• Or 
phi-buf[21{01• 1.0; 
ph!=buf IJJIOI• O; 
., 
., 
•! 
phi buf(O]{l!• .02; 
phi-but[ll [lJ• 1.0 ; 
ph1-buf[2J [11• 1.02 
phl=buf[31 [11• o 
phi buf[OI{2J• 
phl-buf[ll [21• 
phi-bu![2J {21• 
phi=buf[3](2J• 
phi buf(0][3J• o 
phi-buf[1J[3J· 0 
phl-buf(21 [JJ· 0 
phi=buf(3JI3J• 
P buf[OJ [01•10; 
P-buf[OJ(ll• 0; 
P-buf{OJ 121• 10; 
P=buf(OJ(3i• 0; 
P buf{lJ [OJ• 0 
P-buf(lJ (11- 10 
P-buf[ll {21• 10 
P::_bu!(ll [31• o 
P buf(2J(OJ• 0 
P-buf[2J [lJ· 0 
P-buf(2112J• 
P=buf[21 [31• 
P buf(JJIOJ• 
P-buf[JI Ill· 
P-buf[JJ (21• 
P::_buf[3J [31· 
R buf{O)• 0.1; 
R::_buf[ll• 0.1; 
Q buf(OJ•O.Ol; 
Q-buf(l!•O.Ol; 
Q -but 121•0; 
0-buf[li•O; 
Q=bu!(4J•O; 
H buf[OJ (0)•1.0 
H-buf [0 I I 11•0.0 
H::_buf(OJ (2!•0.0 
H buf(li{O)•l.O 
H-buf{ll {1]•0.0 
H=buf[l![2J·O.O 
G buf[OJ {0]• 0.0; 
G-buf[OJ {lJ• 0.0; 
G-buf[OJ [2]· 0; 
c::_buf[OJ {31· o; 
G buf[11 (OJ• 1.0; 
G-buf[lJ(lJ• 0; 
G-buf(l}(2J- 0; 
c::_buf(1J [3!• o ; 
G buf(2J (OJ• 1.0; 
c::_buf(2Jill• o; 
'-..J 
co 
G huf(2J 121• 0 
c::but(2J (31· o 
G bu!(ll [OJ• 0 
G-buf[l} Ill• 0 
G-buf[l} [21• 0 ; 
G::buf[JJ [31• o.o: 
/* End ot stub 
aemTake (aem syatem); 
statea•stat8• but; 
process noise:process noise buf; 
maas noise•me,as noise -buf; -
meas:meas_buf; - -
I* Also reads in phi column checksums */ 
tor (k•O; k < states;k++) 
[ 
tor(j•O; j < (states+ ll;j++l 
{ 
phl(j}[k}•phl bu!(jJ(kJ; 
1: -
1: 
for(k•O; k < at.ates;k+t) 
( 
for (j•O; j < states; j++) 
( 
P(kJ[j(•P but(k}(j}; 
1: -
(; 
JA Also reads in R dlaqonal check.sum */ 
tor (k•O; k < (meas noisef.}) :k++) 
( -
R(k(•R bu![k}; 
I; -
I* Also reads in 0 dlaQonal checksum */ 
for (k•O; k < (process noise+!); k++) 
( -
O!kJ•O bu!(kJ; 
I; -
I* Also reads ln H column checksums *I 
tor(k•OI k < (meas+lJ1k++J 
( 
for(j•OI j < states1J++J 
I 
H[k} (j(•H but[kl [j); 
I; -
I I 
1• Also reads ln G column checksums */ 
for(k•O; k < (states+l);k++• 
{ 
for [j•O; j < process noise; j++J 
( -
G(k](j(•G bu!(kJ(jl; 
II -
1: 
sem.Gl ve (sem ay•tem): 
1: -
• I 
/***** ••• ** •••• •••••• •• **** •••••••• •• * ••••••••• **** ** ************ * * •• **I 
I** Hessaqe simulator stub, which controls how often sys_param_updt **/ 
;u CJets exercised. **/ /***••·································································; 
void simulator 0 
{ 
for(;:) 
( 
taskDelay (300001; 
semGl ve {sem _ updt); 
); 
, ........................................................................... 1 
I** U/D Measurement Update AlQorlthm aft:"er Bierman and Thornton. **/ /** c language version coded by HRM !rom algorithm **/ 
/** qlven by V. Gylys on pp. 278, Control And Dynamic Systems, "*/ 
I* • Advances in Theory and Appllc.at ions, edited by c. T. Leondes ••; 
/** Volume 19: Nonlinear And Kalman Filterlnq Techniques ••t 
I" 
I" 
1,.. modification history 
I** --------------------
1•• 02a, 12may93, mrm added checksum fault tolerance 
1 .. 02c, 19may93, mrm changed error codes 
.. , 
"I 
"I 
.. , 
"I 
.. , 
/** •••• ,. ••• ** ......... ** .,. •• ** "'* •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• **/ 
1 nt mea a updt (y row) 
int Y_tow; -
double ![STATES); 
double g[STATES(; 
double alpha (STATES I; 
double v [STATES I; 
double last alpha, last alpha2; 
double last -U; -
double temp; 
double lambda, lambda ch.eck: 
double check; -
double f_sum, alpha_sum, g_sum, v_sum; 
I nt k, I, j; 
1nt check_status; 
check • o; 
check_status • 0; 
/" I. calculate H•U *I 
for (1•0; 1 < states; it+) 
( 
!(II • H[OJ(IJ: 
fortj•O; j < l; j++J 
( 
I; 
!(II • ![II • H(OI (j('U[jl [IJ; 
1: 
/*Create ! awn • e'•H*U*e */ 
t sum•H(meaoJ (ot•tes-11; 
tOr (k• rat .ate•-21; t>-o: k--, ...., 
1.0 
l 
t awn • t sum+ H[meas][k]• (U[k] [states) t 1): II -
J• Calculate Oi • Dl*fi and checksum */ 
9 sum • O; 
t0r(1•0; l < states; 1++1 
I 
9111 • 0[1]•![1]; 
q sum +• g{l]; 
,; 
t• check D diaQonal checksum 
tor ll•O; j < states; j++) 
I 
check +• Dill: 
1: 
*I 
lf(!abs(check- D[otatea() >EPSILON! 
I 
check status +• 1; 
1: -
check • 0; 
1• lnltl.llize v sum, alpha sum, lambda, lambda check 
v sum - 0; - - -
alpha sum - O: 
lambdi • 0; 
lambda_check • 0; 
I* Start U and D update •1 
last alpha • R.{y row); 
tast:alpha2 - arY_rowJ: 
tor IJ·O; j < states; j++J 
I 
alpha[jl • last alpha+ t(jJ*qJJJ; 
alpha sum •· alpha[jJ; 
lflalphalll !• OJ 
I 
*I 
t• tractional update D{j} and update checksum "/ 
temp • D[jJ; 
D[jJ • (last alpha/alpha[JII*O[j); 
D[statUI •--Dill -temp; 
1: 
1• form v{jl and keep a checksum •1 
v[jJ • QIJJ; 
v_sum +• giJI; 
t• continue update */ 
!f(j !• 0) 
I 
it(laat alpha 
I -
lambda • 0; 
I 
else 
I 
0) 
lambda • -fiJI/last alpha; 
I; -
lambda check • lambda; 
for 11•0; 1 < J; 1++1 
f 
laot_U- Ullllll: 
1: 
temp- v(i)•lambda; 
U(il Ill • U[il Ill +temp; 
I* update U row checksum •1 
U[i((statesj +• temp; 
temp- last u•vrll; 
•Ill • v(il-. last u•v[lJ: 
1• update v sum •7 
v_sum +• telnp; 
1: 
/* check lambda "/ 
if (tabs (lambda - lambda check) > 0.0000011 
I -
if (check status < 2) 
1 -
); 
check stat us + • 2; 
); -
/* check last alpha's "I 
lf{fabs(last alpha- last a!pha2) > 0.000001) I - -
1! (check_status < 4) 
I; 
I 
check_status +• 4; 
1: 
last alpha • alphalll: 
last_::alpha2- alphalll; 
1: 
/* Kalman qain column vector for the y row measurement •1 
I* and form column checksum - *I 
l<(statesJ (y row! • 0; 
for u-o; 1 < states; 1++) 
I 
K[ll[y row] • v[!l/alpha[ (states-!)); 
KlstatesJ [y row( •- Klilly row]; 
I; - -
I* check t• - H*U */ 
check • 0; 
for (k •0; k<states; k + +-) 
I 
check ... check • f [k l: 
1: 
if(fabs(check- f_sum) > EPSILON) 
I 
check status +,.. 8; 
); -
check • 0; 
1• check g • 0*! "I 
for (j•O; j < states; :]'f-+) 
I 
check 
); 
QIJI: 
if (tabs [check - Q sum) > EPSILON) 
1 -
check atatu& +• 16; 
1: -
(X) 
0 
check • 0; 
I" check row checksums of u •1 
!or(j•O; j < states-1; j++} 
l 
for (k•stateo-1; k > j; k--1 
t 
check +• U I j 1 [ k I ; 
); 
lf(fabs(check- U[ji(states]} >EPSILON} 
l 
iftcheck status< 32J 
I -
check status +• 32; 
I: -
); 
check • 0; 
); 
I* check sums for 0 •; 
!or (j•O; j < states; j++) 
l 
check + • 0 [ j [ ; 
I; 
lftfabs(check-C[states)) >EPSILON) 
I 
check status +• 64; 
I: -
check • 0; 
I* check alpha */ 
for {j•O; j < states; j++) 
I 
check 
t; 
alpha [ j): 
l!(tabslcheck- alpha sum) >EPSILON} 
I -
check status +• 128; 
I; -
check • 0; 
t• check v ., 
for tj•O; j < states; j++l 
I 
check +• v( ll: 
1: 
lt(fabs(check- v_sum} >EPSILON! 
I 
check status +• 256; 
); -
ret urn (check_stat us); 
t••···~~~······················ ............................................. l 
/.., U 0 factorization Algorithm 
1 .. C lan<;~uaQe version coded by HRM from alqorlthm 
/ .. qlven by V. Gylys on pp. 21!12, Control And Dynamic Systems, 
, .. Advances ln Theory and Appllcat ions, edited by C. T. Leondes 
;u Volume 19: Nonlinear And Kalman Filtering Techniques 
, .. 
.. , 
.. , 
.. , 
.. , 
.. , 
.., 
tu· Input: nxn 1ymmetrlc matrix P, with maln-diaoonal and 
;u: upper-trianQular elements stored in an n x n array P. 
, .. 
;•• Output: n x n uni\-diaoonal, upper-triangular matrix U, with 
/** lts upper trlanqular portion stored ln n x n array 
1•• U (which can be •equivalenced"' with array 
1•• P so that the original 1' is destroyed). , .. 
/"* Output: The maln-dlaqonal elements of n x n diat;,onal matrix D 
t•• stored in vector D (which optionally can be stored in 
/"* locations of the maln-diaqonal elements ot array P). 
, .. 
t•• Remarks: the alqorlthm does not explicitly Qenerate the maln-
;u diagonal unit elements of U 
, .. 
;u modltlcation history 
, .. --------------------
.. , 
.., 
.., 
.. , 
.. , 
.. , 
.., 
.., 
.. , 
.. , 
.., 
.., 
.. , 
.. , 
.., 
.. , 
.. , 
I*• 02a, 12may93, mrm added checksum !a.ult tolerance .. , 
/,., 02c, 19no.ay93, mrm chang:ed error codes ••; 
;••••••••••"'••• •• ••• • "• • * •• •••• ••• • •• •• ••• • •• •• • • • • • • "* • • • ••• •• •• •••-•• I 
lnt ud __ factor () 
( 
double alpha; 
double beta; 
double check~ 
lnt 1,k,j; 
int check_status; 
che-ck .. 0; 
check status • O: 
D[sta'tes) •0; 
for (j•states-1; J > 0; j--1 
( 
D(j) • P{jJ(j); 
I* D[states} is the location of the checksum */ 
D(states) +• Dill: 
alpha • 1.0/D(j); 
!or(k•O; k < j; k++) 
I; 
I 
!f(j •• lstates-1)) 
I 
U(k) [states) • 0; 
); 
beta • P(kl (J); 
U I k I ( Jl • a! ph a •bet a; 
/* U{kJ (states! is the 1ocat1on of the rowchecksums •; 
U[k}(states( +• U{k)IJI; 
for (1•0; 1 < k; 1 H) 
I; 
I 
P (II [ k 1 -· beta•u [II ( Jl; 
); 
D{O)•P[O) [0]; 
D[states) +• 0(0); 
;• check sums •t 
!or(j•O; j <states; jt+) 
I 
check +• D(jl; 
I; 
lf(fabs(check-D(states}) >EPSILON) Q) 
.... 
check_•tatue +• Sl2; 
1: 
check • O; 
I* check row sums */ 
tor(j•O; j < states-1; j++) 
( 
for (k•otates-1; k > j; k--1 
I 
check +• U { j 1 I k 1; 
); 
lf{hbo(check- U[j![states)l >EPSILON! 
l 
1! (check status < J) 
I -
1; 
check status +• 102(; 
!; -
Chii!!!Ck • 0; 
I: 
return (check_statua:); 
I* • • • • • • • •• • •• • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • •• * • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •t 
I*" U/D Factor Propaqatlon fT1me Update) ••1 
/* • C lanouage version coded by MRM from alQorl thm •• 1 
;u ;tven by v. Gylys on pp. 284. Control And Dynamic Systems, ••t 
t• • Advance• in Theory and Applications, ed 1 ted by C. T. Leon des .. / 
/** Volume 19: Nonlinear And K.alman Filtering Techniques ••1 
I*" • *I 
/u Input: U.D,Q,G 
, .. 
,..,, Calc: n x N symmetric matrix W, with rows wl""T, ••. wn"'T. , .. 
/** Calc: N x N dlaqonal matrh DO defined by {0 0;0 01 
, .. 
t•• Output: the upper trlanqular part U of prop.aqated n x n 
/** unlt-diaqonal, upper-trianqular mo~trix U. 
, .. 
I'* Output: the main dlaqonal elements, stored .a.s a vector D, 
I** of n x n dlaqonal matrix D. 
, .. 
1•• Define; wj""(O) • wj for j • 1, -··• n. 
, .. 
, .. 
, .. madiflc~:t ion history 
, .. -~------------------
··I 
.., 
"I 
.., 
.. , 
"I 
.. , 
.., 
.., 
"I 
"I 
.., 
• 'I 
"I 
"I 
.. , 
.. , 
1., 02a, 12may93,. mrm added checksum fault tolerance. **/ 
/** 02c, 19may93, mrm ch•n;ed error codes. ••t 
t•• 02d, 21may93, mrm added sem W DO to control when fault occurs . .. 1 
, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ;.; ..................................... 1 
I nt ud_!actor_prop 0 
f 
double DD inner prod; 
double ch8clt,w_Sum,Temp; 
int i,j,k; 
int check_atatus; 
check - 0; 
check_statu• • 0; 
I* form larqe DO matrix of dia9onal elements *I 
tor (1•0; !<states; 1 ++) 
f 
DD{l)•D[l]; 
I; 
for (1•0; 1<process_no1se; it+) 
I 
DD(states+l1•Q[ll; 
); 
I* Form dlaqonal checksum •1 
OD(states+process_nol.seJ • D{statesJ + O[process_noisej; 
/* .. Put DO fault here •••t 
It (fault type •• 31 
I -
semGi ve (sem W OD) : 
I; --
1•••• • Creo~te W •(PHI*U I GJ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••1 
ror (i •0; 1 <states; i +•) 
( 
I; 
tor ll•O; j<states; j++) 
I 
!; 
w !11 I l 1 •phi I 1! ! l 1 ; 
!or (k•j-1; k>•O; k--1 
( 
W(1! (j]•W[1) (j)+phl(l)[l<I'U(k)(j); 
!; 
t• Create le' *PHI) •u •t 
for (j•O; j<states; j H·l 
I 
W(states! (j)•ph1(states[ Ill: 
for (k•l-l:k>•O;l<--1 
1: 
I 
W(states1 [ji•W[states) [j)+phl[states1 [l<I'Uikl (j]; 
I; 
t• Create check • e' "'PHt•u•e •J 
check-phllstates!tstates-1]; 
for (k• lst.ates-2 t; k >•0; k--) 
I 
check • check+ phl(statesj(k]•(UfkJ(states! t ll; 
1: 
t• check calculation of PHI*U */ 
W sum • 0; 
tOr tj•O; j<states; j+•) 
I 
for (k•O; k<states; k+ + l 
I 
II sum • W own+ W[kl [j!; 1: -
); 
1f (fabo (Check - ll_sum) > EPSILON! 
00 
1'-.) 
check •tatua +• 2041; 
}; -
check - 0; 
1• also include column checksum elements for G ln bottom row of W •1 
for~ 1•0; i<atatea+l; l++) 
t 
1: 
for (j•O; j<procass noise; 1++) 
t -
W[ 1 l[atates+11•G [!I [ 11; 
1: 
!••••• Perform D-orthogonallzatlon •••••••••••••••! 
D[statesi•O.O; 
JH reset U{il (states} • 0 •••t 
for (1•0; 1 < states; 1++) 
t 
U[ll [states)•O; 
1: 
!••• Put W fault hare **"'/ 
1t (fault type •• 41 
I -
sem.Gtve (sam w DO); 
J; --
/** start orthogonali,ation .. , 
for t1•atates-l; j > 0; 1--1 
I 
D[j)•O.O; 
tor (1•0; 1 < (states+process noise); 1++} 
I -
Dill +•ll[j)lll'W[ji[II'DD[II; 
I; 
t••• New diagonal checkiUIII •••1 
Dlstatesl +• D[j); 
for (1•0; 1 < 1: 1++1 
I 
DO inner prod•O.O; 
tor (k•O; -k < (statea•proceas noise); k++} 
I -
DD Inner prod +• W[ll [k)'W[j) [k)'DD[k); 
I;- -
U[ll [jl • DD Inner prod/0[11; 
J•• Keep traCk of ilew row checksum for U **/ 
U[l)(statesl +• U(IJij); 
for (k•O; k < (states+proc.ess noise); k++) 
I; 
I; 
0[01•0.0; 
I -
Temp • U[!IIJI'WIJI [k); 
ll[l)[kl • ll[l)[kl- Temp; 
;u Also subtract temp from M(statesj {k) **/ 
W[states)lk) • W[states) [k) -Temp; 
I; 
!or (1•0; 1 < (states+proce.ss nolae); 1+-+) 
I -
0[0) +• W{OIJII'W[O)[I)•DD[I); 
I; 
/*** last update of d1aoonal eheckaum tor 0 ... , 
0 [states) +• 0[01; 
I* check row checksums ot U ., 
for (j•O; j < states-!; j++) 
I 
for (k•states-1; k > j; k--) 
I 
check +• u! j I [k I; 
); 
lf{fabs(check- U[j) [states)) >EPSILON) 
I 
If {check_status < 4096) 
[ 
); 
check status +• 4096; 
); -
check • 0; 
J; 
/* check sums for D •t 
!or lj•O; j < states; j++l 
I 
check +• O[j); 
J; 
lt(!abs(check-O[states)J >EPSILON) 
I 
check status +• 8192; 
I; -
check • 0; 
I' check sums for DO */ 
!or(j•O; j < (states+ process noise•; :l••• 
I -
check +• OO[j); 
J; 
1 f ( !abs (chec.k-00 {states+process noise)) > EPS !LON) 
I -
check status +• 16384; 
I; -
check • O: 
I* check column sums of w... */ 
for (j•O; j < (process noise + states); j++J 
I -
for (k•O; k < states; k++) 
I 
check +• W[kl [j); 
); 
If (fabslcheck - W[statesl [j)) > EPSILON) 
I 
If {check status < 32768) 
I -
); 
check stat us -t- 3 2 '7 68; 
I; -
check - 0; 
I; 
/** more fault control !or W and DO ••1 
If !fault type •• 31 
( -
1emTake tsem_W_DD); 00 
w 
); 
If (fault type •• 4) 
t -
aemTake (sem H OD) ; 
); --
/** return &tatus **/ 
return (check_statua); 
I• ••••• ** •••• •• •• •• •• •• "*** •~~t •• **** •••• • ****" • • ** • * •• * • • • •• •• •• *I 
/** Task killer is called to delete all the spaliined tasks. ""/ 
, •••••••••••• ** •••••••••••••••••••••• ** ••••••••• * ................ , 
vold task killer (1) 
1nt I; 
t• 
If (1 •• 0) 
I 
taskDelete (tldl 1 
taskDelete (tld21 
UskDelete (tldl) 
taskDelete (t ld4l 
taskDelete (tldS) 
taskDelete(tld6) 
fclose(fpU); 
fclose(fpD); 
fclose(fpKQaln); 
fclose ( fp£r rorl); 
); 
return; 
•t 
/****"*"** • •• •• •• •• •• ... •• •••••••••• •••••••• •••• •• •• .. * •• •• •• •• * • •• •• * ••• *I 
I" 
t•• 
t•• 
oet_tlme - returns a floattn9 point number that contains the **/ 
number of SECONDS on the olobal tick counter. .. , 
"I 
I* ••• ** •• * * • • •• •• •• *" •• ** •••••• *** * •••••••••••"' * • ** •• •"' •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •••t 
tloat Qet t !me 0 
I -
ULONG ticks; 
ticks • tlckGet(); 
ret urn ((float) t 1 cks/TICKS _PER_ SEC); 
, ............................................................. , 
I** Print out matrlcies .. I 
, ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 11 •••••••••••••• 11 •••••••• , 
vold prlntm (a, row, col) 
int row,col; 
double all (STATES); 
i nt 1, j, btm, top, count; 
print f (•\n• J; 
btm•top•O; 
while Cbtm<col) 
I 
top-wunln(col, (bta+l)); 
printt(•prlntlno matrix columna 'cl to 'd\n•,btlll, (top-1)); 
tor(j•O;j<row; j++) 
); 
ret urn; 
( 
tor (l•btm; 1 <top; 1 ++) 
( 
pr! nt t I • •• •, a I j !Ill 1 : 
l: 
print! t•\n"J; 
I; 
btm~·e; 
/*ll**••··························*··························t t•• Print out vector ••/ 
, ................................................. , .......... , 
void printv(J~,lenqth) 
lnt length; 
double a {); 
lnt l,btm,top; 
printf("\n•); 
btm•top•O; 
while (btm<lenqth) 
I 
top-mm.1n (length, (btm+8)}; 
printf(•printinq vector entries td to lld\n",btm, (top-Ill; 
); 
return; 
for(i•btm; i<top; 1++) 
I 
printf(• \e", a(i}); 
); 
prlntf("\n"); 
btm+•B; 
/" • "* ** *" *" *****"•** *"II*** • * • • * "'* ** ** •• •• ** •• • **"'*II t *'"* ** • **I /"' * continue 
.. I /*lllllfll····lllllflltt•••······················<l····················; 
void cant(} 
semG1ve(sem __ t1me_step_syncl; 
ret urn; 
, .......................... ~ ........................ 111 ••••••••••• / 
/** Stop 
.. I 
, ................................. **lltlllr ••••<~••••••••11•••••11•/ 
vold stop() 
( 
go_on • 'n'j 
return: 
, ..................... , .................. 11<1******•••••••····11-·J 
, .. Roque software to cause problems with the calculatlon ••1 
, ... modification history • •t 
I*, -------------------- .. , 
, ... 02c, 19may93, mrm. 
.added D fault type .. , 
00 
.l:'-
t•··························································J void roqueo 
I 
taakDelay{roque start,; 
torftn -
I 
1f (fault type •• 1) 
I -
U{OJ !11 • ro;ue value; 
) -
else 1f (fault type •• 2) ( -
D[O) • roque value: 
) -
else if (fault type •• 3) ( -
semTake (sem W OD); 
DO{ 1 J • rooUe-value; 
semGive (sem W-DD); 
l --
else if (fault type •• 4) ( -
semTake (sem W DO); 
Hill [OJ • ro;ue value; 
semGi ve (sem w o0); 
); --
pt·intf ("'Gotta love me step \n"l; 
taskDelay (roque delay); 
); -
I*• •••Ill• • • * •••• •• • •••••••••• • •• *"' • • •• • • •• •• •• • * ** • • •• * • * • •• • I 
/** Start **/ 
1•• modification hlatory **/ I•. __________ .., ________ _ 
.. , 
ru 02b, 18may9J, mrm transfer file to rsf via ftp **/ 
1 ... 02c, 19may93, mrm added request for fault type 111 */ 
, .. 
,.,, 02d, 2?rnay93, mm 
, .. 
and chanqed period to make faster ••1 
added sem W DO, changed to 1 sec •• I 
period (det:;ults chanqed) 0 ••1 ;···························································; 
void start_ me (I 
I 
sysClkRateSet (TICKS PER SEC I; 
t1ckSet (0); /*seta-the-time reference to zero*/ 
sem system • semCreate 0: 
sem-t lme step sync • semcreate (): 
sem-updt-- seincreate 0; 
sem=W_DD • semCreate(); 
host Add (•rsf", "139. 78.3 o 7•): 
netOevCreate (• rsf: •, •rst•, 1) : 
aemG 1 ve ( sem. updt) ; 
aeft\Cive (sem=system); 
print!P'\nPleaae enter the fault type: 1 tU), 
1f ((scan! l"'d", Hautt type)) •• NULL I I 
(fault typ8 !• 1 '' fault type !• 
" fault_type !· 411 -
!Dl, 3 (DD), 4 (Wl :\n"); 
'' tault_type ! • 3 
print!("\nError enterin9 !ault typeJ Default 1 aet.\n"); 
tault type • 1; 
l; -
printf("\nPlease enter the value of the rooue information,\n"J; 
print f C"wlth declma 1 point: l.e o, -10. 7\n"); 
l"t {{scant ("Uf", Hoque_value) l •• NULL) 
I 
prlntf("\nError entering value! Default -10 set.\n•); 
roque_value ... -10; 
l; 
print!("\nThe value entered is: '! \n", roque_value); 
print! ("\nPlease enter the delay for the roque routlne:\n"): 
1 f ((scan! (•\d", 'roque delay)) •• NULL) 
I -
pdntf("\nError entering delay! Default 6000 seto\n•); 
rogue delay • 6000: 
I; -
pr1ntff"\nPlease enter the starting delay tor the rogue routine:\n"'); 
1f({scanf("\d•,,rogue_start}) •• NULL) 
I 
print!("'\nError enter1nq startinq delay! Default 3000 set.\n•J; 
rogue_delay • 3000; 
); 
t1dl • taskSp,a,wn(•param•,7o,O,STACKSIZ£,sys param updt); 
taskDelay (10); - -
tld2 • period(l,cont): 
taskDelay (101; 
t1d3 • taskSpawn("'!ilter 1n1t",80,VX STDIO,STACKSlZE,fllter init); 
taskOelay (10); - - -
t 1d4 • taskSpawn (•sim lnt ", 60, 0, STACKSIZE, simulator); 
task.Delay (10); -
tidS .. t.askSpavnt•rogue"',55,0,STACKSIZE,ro.gue); 
task.Delay (10); 
co 
VI 
' Hatlab tile uoed to plot !ilter performance 
t and fault detection information. 
• FILE: covplotnt .m 
' l-18-93 
\ mod1!1cat1on history 
' --------------------
' 02a, 17may93, mrm 
' added featurel!l to remove the files 
' 
Upper.m, kqaln.m, DlaqP.m, errorl.m from the Unix 
directory in which they reside. Added while loop to 
plot five 1100 time steps} postscript plots and 
than plot lndeflnltely to the screen thereafter. 
Improved information on plots. 
' OJa, 19may93, mrm 
' 
ch.anqed while loop to look for files and all kinds o! stuff 
' 03b, 27may93, mrm 
chanqed 
chanoed 
chanqed 
' 
' 
' OJc, 11 june93, mrm 
stuff to make the postscript files look riQht. 
stu!! to make plots less cluttered. 
tor a 1 second time step 
made unique files for plots • 
••• .......................... ....... •• ·-·· ••••••••••••••••••••• 11111*11• **** ••• 
current time • -1; 
! sleep I so 
while (l), 
cpu t lmel • cputtme; 
~Qain 
UpperP 
CiaQP 
errorl 
lndexlOO 
if current time •• -1, 
time of error .. time of error + 2; 
elem-lo'Cat2 • 15; - -
elem-locatl • 15; 
else, -
elem locat2 • 80; 
elem-locat1 - 90; 
end; -
(1ndex100'100 • 11) • ••• 
-1). 
1 f (current tJme 
(current -time 
current_time - (1ndex100'100) • 1; 
end; 
dlmen•size(U)'(l OJ' 
states•aJ z.e {K) • (0 1)' 
steps•[current tlme:l: (current tlme+dlmen-ll )'; 
K al t • I<; - -
,-*This stuff was used to crop an area around the labels* 
\blank 1 • elem locatl; 
\blank -2 ... elem-locat1+7; 
'blank -3 • elem-locat2; 
tblank-4 • elem-locat2+7; 
\K alt(blank. l;blank 2,:) .. nan•k alt(blank l:blank 2,:); 
\K -a It (blank -3 :blank-4, 2) • nan• K-a 1 t {blank-J:blank-4, 2); 
\M-alt (blank-1:blank-2,2J - K(b1ank 1:b1ank-2,2); -
axls~'auto'l""i - -
!lqure (1) 
tsubplot (2, 1, 1) 
plot (steps,~ altJ 
1 t current t"1me ·- -1, 
uh((-1 100 -.5 3.5J); 
end; 
xlabel ('Time Step, k <'o• marks flr•t detection ln current frame>') 
yl•bel ('KJ~laan Gains, Jlt') 
tor index .. l:l:states, 
it index .... 1, 
text(steps(elem locatl),K(elem locatl,l),'K(l,:)'); 
if error type _: 0, -
hold on-
plot(steps(time of error),K(time of error,l), 'o') 
hold of! - - - -
end; 
el$e1 t index .... 2, 
text(steps(elem locat2),K(elem locat2,2),'K(2,:)'); 
if error type _: 0, -
hold on-
plot(steps(t1me of error},K(time of error,21, •o~l 
hold off - - - -
end; 
elseif index -- 3, 
text(steps(elem locatll,fll(elem locatl,J),'K{3,:)'); 
if error type _:- 0, -
hold on-
plot(steps~tlme ot error},K(tlme of error,3), 'o') 
hold off - - - -
end; 
elseif index -- 4, 
text(stepstelem locatl),K(elem locat1,4),'K{4,:)'); 
lf error type .. :- 0, -
hold on-
plot(steps(tlme of error),K(tlme of error,4), 'o') 
hold or! - - - -
end; 
else!. f index •• 5, 
text(steps(elem locatl),K(elem locatl,SI,'K(S,:}'J; 
Jf error type : .. 0, -
hold on-
plot(steps(time of error),K(tlme of er-ror,S), 'a' I 
hold off - - - -
end; 
els.el t index ·- 6, 
text(steps(elem locatl},K(elem locat1,6),'K(6,:)'); 
if error type : .. 0, -
hold on-
plot(steps(time of error),K(time of error,6), 'a'} 
hold ot r - - - -
end; 
elself index •• 7, 
text(steps(elem locatl),K(elem locat1,1),'K(1,:)~); 
if error type :. 0, -
hold on-
plot(steps(tlme of error),K(time of error,71, 'o') 
hold oft - - - -
end; 
elseif index •• B, 
text(steps(elem locatl),K(elem locatl,8),'K(8,;)'l; 
if error type :. 0, -
hold on-
plot{steps(time of error),!<{tlme of error,8), 'o' J 
hold of! - - - -
end; 
else; 
end; 
end; 
s•sprlnt f ('FAULT PERIOD (steps} • td', round (roque delay/ (60))): 
text((max(steps)-99), (max(max(l<.)) 11 0-9}, s); -
a•spr1ntf(•fAULT VALUE .... \8_3!', roque value); 
text((m.ax(ltepa}-99), (maxcm.ax(f())*O.i2), a); 
CXI 
0'\ 
1t fault type -- 1, 
text( (mAX (steps) -99), (max (max (K)) *0.81), 'FAULT AFFECTS -> U'); 
end; 
1t fault type -- 2, 
text((max(ateps)-99), (max(max(K))*0.81), 'FAULT AFFECTS-> 0'); 
end; 
it fault type -- J, 
text((mAX(steps)-99), (max(max(K))*0,81), 'FAULT AFFECTS-> 00'); 
end; 
it fault type -- 4, 
text ((max (steps) -99) , (max (max tK) ) •o. 81), • FAULT AFFECTS -> W') ; 
end; 
'text ((max (steps) -20), (max (max UO) •o. g}, date); 
if error type -• 0, 
•text(steps(tlme o! error), (max(max(K))*.S), ••• 
,. 0 -> SOFTWARE FAULT DETECTED'); 
s•sprlntt ('ERROR TYPE • 'd', error type); 
text(ateps(tlme ot error), (max(mai{K))".4~, s); 
end; - -
title(' SOFTWARE FAULT EFFECT ON SINGLE MEASUREMENT UOU' KALMAN GAINS') 
if current time <• 401, 
print -dpi -append oaln cov.ps; 
e~; -
' Error Covariance 
figure (2); 
\subplot (2, 1, 2) 
torn • l:l:dlmen, 
utemp • (reshape (U (n,:) latatea, states))'; 
ptemp•utemp*dlag (0 (n,:) ', 0) •utemp'; 
p (n,:, •reshape (ptemp' r 1, (states•states)); 
end; 
Palt•P; 
'for index .. 0:1: (states-1) , 
H alt (blank l:blonk 4, (!+index• (statea+l))) -
'nin•P alt (blank l:blank 4, (l+index.• (atatea+l})); 
\end; - - -
H alt(blank J:blank 4,1) - P(blsnk 3:blank 4,1); 
,P-alt(blank-l:blank-2,1) • nan•P alt(blank-l:bl~nk 2,U; 
pl0t(steps,P=altl - - - -
if current time •• -1, 
uls((-1 100 -.05 1211 
end; 
xlabel('Time Steps, k <,o~ marks first detection in current frame>') 
ylabel('Error Covariance Matrix Elements, P'J 
to[" index • 0:1: (Stltes-11, 
if index •• 0, 
text (steps (elem _locat 1) , P (elem_locat 1, ( 1 +index* (states+ 1) ) 1 , • P (1, 1) •) : 
if error type .... 0, 
hold on -
plot (steps (tlme_of_error) 1 P (tlma_of_error, (l+lndex* (states+l))), • o'l 
hold off 
end; 
elself index •• 1, 
text {steps (elem locat 2), P (e lem locat 2, {1+ lndex• (states+ 1 J ) ) , 1 P ( 2, 2J '); 
1 f error type ... : 0, -
hold on -
plot (steps (t lme _of_ error), P {time _o!_ error, (1 + index• (st at.es+ 1) 1 ) 1 • o• ) 
hold ott 
end; 
l!lseif index -- 2, 
text (at epa (elem_loca.t2) ,P (elem_locat2, (l+lndex"' (st.ates+l))), 'P (J, 3) •): 
it error type .... O, 
hold on -
plot (steps (time _ot_error), P (t 1me _ ot _error, (1 + index• (Stl.tes+l J) ) , • o' ) 
hold off 
end; 
elsei! index -- 3, 
text (steps (elem locat 2), P (elem locat2, (1 +index• (states+l))), 'P (4, 4) '}; 
if error type -= 0, -
hold on -
plot(steps(time of error}, P(tlme of error, (l+lndex.*(atates+l))), 'O') 
hold of! - - - -
end; 
elself index -- 4, 
text (steps (elem locat2) ,P (elem locat2, (l+lndex* (states+l))), • P (5, 5)'); 
1! error type _:; 0, -
hold on -
plot(steps(t1me of error), P(tirne of error, (ltlndex•tstates+l)l), 'o') 
hold off - - - -
end; 
elseif index -- 5, 
text (steps (elem locat 2) , P (e lem locat2, (1 +index* (states+ 1) ) ) , • P ( 6, 6) •) : 
1 f error type .;: O, -
hold on -
plot(steps(time of error), P(time of error, (l+index•(states+l})), 'o') 
hold off - - - -
end; 
else! t index •• 6, 
text (steps {elem locat2), P (elem locat2, (1+ index., (states+l))), 'P (7, 7) 1 ): 
1! error type .. : o, ~ 
hold on -
plot(stepa(time of error), P(time ot error, (l+index•(states+l})), 'o'} 
hold off - - - --
end; 
elseif Lndex -· 7, 
text (steps (elem locat 2) , P (elem locat 2, (1-t 1 ndex• (states+l) ) ) , 'P (8, 81 •): 
if error type ... : 0, -
hold on -
plot(steps(t1me of error), P{time of error, (l+index"(states+l)J), 'o') 
hold off - - - -
end; 
else; 
end; 
end; 
s•sprint! ('FAULT PERIOD (step!!:) - 'd', round (roQue delay/ {60))): 
text{(max(steps)-99), {max(max(P) )"0.9), sl; -
s•spr1ntf ('FAULT VALUE • ,8,3!', roque value): 
text((max(steps)-99}, (max(max(P)).,0,72), s}; 
lf fault type •• 1, 
text ( (mix (steps)- 99), (max (max (P 1 1 •a. 81) 1 • fAULT AFFECTS -> U' 1 ; 
end; 
if fault type •• 2, 
text((ifiax{steps}-99), (max(max(Pl}"0.81), 'FAULT AFFECTS-> D'l: 
end; 
1! f.!lult type •• 3, 
text{(max(steps)-99), (max(max(Pll"0.811, 'FAULT AfF'ECTS -> DD'l; 
end; 
lf !ault type •• 4, 
text ( tniax (steps) -99) I {max (max (P)) •o. 81), , FAULT AffECTS -> w·); 
end; 
\text ((max (steps} -20), (max (max (PI ) •o. 91 , date 1; 
i! error type .... 0,. 
\text(st8ps(tlme of errot), (max(max1P))"0*5), .•• 
,. 0 •> SOFTWARE FAULT DETECTED' I; 
s•sprintf ('ERROR TYPE - \d', error type); 
text{stepa(tirne of error), (max(maXtP)).,0.4}, sl: 
end; - -
title(' SOFTWARE FAULT EFFECT ON SINGLE HEllS. UDU' ERROR COVARIANCE' I; 
(X) 
-..j 
1 f current time <• 401, 
pr1 nt -dpl .. append qatn cov .pa; 
end; -
lf current time •• 401, 
lcp galn cov.ps thesls$$.ps 
lrm qain-cov.ps 
end; -
current time • current time + 100; 
lf current time -- 99; 
current time • 101; 
end; -
track cputime • cputime - cpu tlmel 
whoa - -
' f rm UpperP.m 
l rm. DlaqP .m 
I rm ~qaln.m 
! rm errorl.m 
cpu tlme2 • cputime 
til; sum•O; 
tlme:::before_plot • 90; 
while (file sum < 4), 
test for tiles • la; 
fileS stie • size(test for filea)"[O 1)'; 
t l!e ium • 0; - -
for nl- 1:1: ({l!es slze-8!, 
file sum • tile aUm • atrcmp{test for flles(l,nl:(nl+'l~l,'errorLm')t 
end; - - - -
for n2 • l:l:(flles slze-8), 
file 8Utn • file sum+ atrcmp{teat for f1les(l,n2:(n2+7}},'UpperP.m'}; 
end; - - - -
for nl • 1:1: {files size-1}, 
file sum • tile sUm + strcmp{test for files (l,nJ: (n3+6} ~, '01a;P.m'); 
end; - - - -
for n4 - 1:1: (flies aiJ:e-7}, 
file sum • tile sUm+ strcm.p(test for flles(l,n4:(n4+6l},'Koa1n.m•J; 
end; - - - -
file sum 
time=:before_plot • tlme_be!ore_plot - (eputlme- cpu_t1me2) 
!sleep 20 
end; 
clear P 
'return to ma.tlab 
end; 
()) 
()) 
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